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This volume contains the output of country research
undertaken in Poland in 2000–2001 by Barbara B³aszczyk,
Micha³ Górzyñski, Tytus Kamiñski and Bart³omiej Paczóski
under the international comparative project "Secondary Pri-
vatization: the Evolution of Ownership Structures of Priva-
tized Enterprises". The project was supported by the Euro-
pean Union's Phare ACE* Programme 1997 (project P97-
8201 R) and was coordinated by Barbara B³aszczyk of the
Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE) in War-
saw, Poland.
The support of the ACE Programme made it possible to
organize the cooperation of an international group of schol-
ars (from the Czech Republic, France, Poland, Slovenia and
the U.K.). The entire project was devoted to the investiga-
tion of secondary ownership changes in enterprises priva-
tized in special privatization schemes (i.e., mass privatization
schemes and MEBOs**) in three Central European coun-
tries – the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Through a
combination of different research methods, such as sec-
ondary analysis of previous research, analysis of legal and
other regulatory instruments, original field research, statisti-
cal data base research and econometric analysis of individual
enterprise data, the project aimed to investigate the scope,
pace and trends in secondary ownership changes, the fac-
tors and barriers affecting them and the degree of owner-
ship concentration resulting from them. 
The authors of this report look at ownership changes in
the companies owned by the Polish National Investment
Funds in the 1995–2000 period. They analyze the numbers
of companies in the NIFs' portfolios were sold to what types
of investors (i.e., domestic corporate, domestic individual,
employee, foreign, other NIFs, public trading) in which
years. A great deal of attention is also paid to the issue of
changes in the ownership of the funds themselves as well as
the issues of corporate governance in the funds (manage-
ment costs, strategies, etc.) Finally, the economic perfor-
mance of NIF portfolio companies is compared with other
groups of companies in Polish economy, and then the group
of NIF companies is broken down with respect to type of
owner that acquired (or kept) them, and these groups are
compared with each other. 
We hope that the results of this research will be of great
interest for everyone interested in the little-researched
question of what has happened to companies after privati-
zation in transition countries.
Barbara B³aszczyk
Preface
* "Action for Cooperation in the Field of Economics".
** Management-Employee Buyouts.
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The April 1993 Act on National Investment Funds (NIF)
formed the basis for the Polish mass privatization program,
allowing every adult Polish citizen to acquire a portion of
national assets for a nominal charge. The NIF program was
supposed to accelerate the pace of privatization, while at
the same time providing for the restructuring of enterprises
prior to their privatization, facilitated by the expertise of the
professional management companies employed by the
NIFs. The National Investment Funds were special institu-
tions created for this program in the legal form of joint stock
companies, but subject to strong government influence for
at least the first three years of the program. At the begin-
ning of the program, majority stakes in the 512 enterprises
participating in the program were turned over to the 15
National Investment Funds, whose tasks included restruc-
turing and privatizing those companies. The management
companies, which were to manage the funds on a contrac-
tual basis, were responsible for improving the financial
results of companies held by the funds and raising the value
of the funds' assets. They could achieve this by directly or
indirectly participating in the companies' restructuring or by
supporting their sale to strategic investors; they were also
allowed to liquidate the companies and to make portfolio
investments. In effect, profound evolution of the ownership
structure of both the NIF portfolio companies and the funds
was expected.
Our paper presents the directions of the secondary
ownership changes of the Polish National Investment Funds
and their portfolio companies, trying to explain the factors
influencing this evolution and investigating its results. The
second and third sections illustrate the initial ownership
structure and its evolution at the level of the funds. Here,
we look at the level of ownership concentration and rea-
sons for consolidation. The main investors in the funds are
identified, and their motives are examined. We then move
onto a discussion of management of the funds, in which we
present the difficulties in corporate governance of the funds
and of the portfolio companies, in connection with the dif-
fering interests of the various program participants. We also
discuss the management costs of the funds. In the fifth sec-
tion, we analyze NIF strategies, focusing specially on their
privatization strategies, and identify the new owners of NIF
portfolio companies who emerged in the secondary privati-
zation process.
The next two sections present the performance of NIF
companies in comparison with other groups of Polish enter-
prises and investigate the economic situation of these firms
(grouped according to the type of owner). This analysis was
conducted on the basis of an original database, gathered
from different sources. Using the incomplete financial and
qualitative data of the NIF portfolio companies collected by
the Ministry of State Treasury (for 1995–1997) as a starting
point, the data base was supplemented with data published
by the Warsaw Stock Exchange, the over-the-counter mar-
ket CETO (Centralna Tablica Ofert), and other stock mar-
ket publications. Finally, a large part of the data were gath-
ered from Monitor Polski B, in which all joint stock compa-
nies are obliged to publish their yearly financial results. In
effect, a database reporting on the ownership structure and
financial results of 429 NIF portfolio companies (out of a
total of 512) for the years 1995–2000 was completed,
allowing for a broad microeconomic analysis.
Part I.
1. Introduction
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The National Investment Fund Program (NIF Program)
differs from the mass privatization programs adopted in
other Central and Eastern European countries, which
focused on the rapid transfer of companies to private hands
but without providing any specific mechanism for their
restructuring. By way of contrast, the NIF Program was
designed not only as a means of enabling the transfer of a
significant part of the state sector's assets to Polish citizens,
but also as a mechanism for actively restructuring the com-
panies participating in mass privatization. 
The detailed conceptual and design work on the NIF
Program started in 1991. The Law on National Investment
Funds and Their Privatization (the NIF Act), which provided
the necessary legal framework, was adopted by the Parlia-
ment on the 30th of April, 19931. In December 1994 the
Minister of Ownership Transformation established 15
National Investment Funds in the form of joint stock com-
panies. The State contributed to the funds the shares of the
state companies which had agreed to participate into the
Program. In the end there were 512 of them. 
The State Treasury contributed to the established funds
60% of the shares of each company. However, 27% of the
shares of each company were contributed in equal parts to
all funds, expect for one, which received a package of 33%
of the shares of a given company. This allocation scheme
was supposed to create an effective corporate governance
mechanism by ensuring the dominant position of one "lead"
fund in each company. As a result, each NIF held 34–35 lead
shareholding positions (33%) and almost 480 minority hold-
ings in other companies included in the program. Pursuant
to the NIF Law, up to 15% of the shares of each company
were distributed, free of charge, to the employees, and in
certain cases other entitled individuals (farmers and fisher-
men) who had certain contractual supplier relationships
with the companies concerned received as much as a fur-
ther 15%. The remaining shares in each company (25%)
were retained by the State. The initial shareholding struc-
ture of the companies participating in the program immedi-
ately following contribution of their shares to the National
Investment Funds is presented in a table 2.1.
At that stage (1995–1996), the value of the funds
equaled the value of the contributed shares, as the State
Treasury received the shares of the funds in return for the
contributed company shares. The State Treasury become
100% owner of each fund and nominated the members of
the supervisory boards of the funds. According to the Law
on NIFs, the supervisory boards were responsible for
appointing, signing and supervising the management con-
tracts with the management firms. The management firms
were selected by a public tender among Polish and foreign
reputable commercial banks, consulting firms, foreign fund
management firms and investment banks. They have been
responsible for improving the management and strengthen-
ing the market position of the NIFs through restructuring,
providing access to capital and introducing new technologies
to the companies in the NIFs' portfolios.  
The law did not establish the division of labor and
responsibilities between the management boards of the
funds and their management firms. This was to be resolved
later, in the charters of each NIF individually (as well as in
the appropriate contracts). In most cases, these two func-
tions were merged, to be carried out by a single entity. 
1 Dziennik Ustaw, No. 44, item 202, dated May 31, 1993.
2. The Institutional and Legal Framework 
of the NIF Program and the Initial Ownership Structure
of the National Investment Funds
Table 2.1. The initial shareholding structure of the NIF portfolio companies 
%
Lead National Investment Funds 33
Other National Investment Funds 27
Employees 15
State Treasury 25
TOTAL 100
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Pursuant to the provisions of the NIF Law the fee for
services of the management firms consists of three parts: an
annual fixed cash fee for management services2, an annual
performance fee for financial results (equal to 1% of the
value of NIF shares for each year of management services),
and a final performance fee for financial results (equal to
0.5% of the value of NIF shares for each year of manage-
ment services).
Finally 14 of the NIFs' supervisory boards signed con-
tracts with management firms. One NIF did not sign a con-
tract and instead made other arrangements for the manage-
ment of its portfolio, directly employing Polish specialists in
finance and law. On July 1995 the Minister of Ownership
Transformation, acting as the main shareholder of the NIFs,
accepted the 10-year management Contracts negotiated by
the supervisory boards.
The second phase of the NIF Program consisted of
two stages: the distribution of the certificates of owner-
ship (CO) and the initiation of trading of the NIFs' shares
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The process of distribut-
ing certificates of ownership started in November 1995.
The State Treasury issued the certificate in physical form,
to the bearer. The right to receive a certificate was not
transferable and was not inheritable. However, the certifi-
cate itself was fully transferable and inheritable, allowing
for unrestricted secondary market trading. The certificate
entitled the holder to exchange it for an equal number of
shares in each NIF3. The exchange process was carried
out by licensed brokerage houses, which deposited the
certificates at the National Depository of Securities. The
Depository exchanged the certificates for NIF shares.
Once the exchange was effected, all rights related to the
certificate expired and the holder became a shareholder
of the National Investment Funds. The exchange process
started in May 1997.
There were 27.8 million Polish citizens entitled to
receive the certificates of ownership. On the day when the
distribution process started, the over-the-counter market
started to operate. In July 1996 certificates started being list-
ed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The distribution process
finished in November 1996. Over 95% of the entitled citi-
zens received certificates.
In April 1997 the State Security and Exchange Commis-
sion gave permission for the shares of the 15 National
Investment Funds to be listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange. The quotation of the NIFs started in June 1997.
The validity of the certificates expired on 31 December,
19984. The certificates covered 85% of the shares of the
NIFs. 15% of shares were reserved for the performance-
related element of the fund Manager's remuneration. 
As illustrated above, in its logistical aspect, the distribu-
tional part of the mass privatization program in Poland func-
tioned very well: all tasks were fulfilled, and all deadlines
were met. However, the realization of the substantive end-
goals of the program was much more difficult. 
2 The annual management fees were agreed separately for each management firm. In some cases the fee differed in order to reflect differences in
the number of lead shareholdings. The fees for the services of the management firms in the first year varied from 2,5 to 3 million USD.
3 One certificate was exchangeable for a single share in each of the National Investment Funds.
4 This meant that after that day, the certificates were no longer exchangeable for NIF shares.
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3.1. The Ownership Concentration
Process in the National Investment Funds
For almost four years after launching of the NIF Pro-
gram5 the ownership structure of the National Investment
Funds was mainly determined by the institutional and legal
framework established by the NIF Law. From the beginning,
the State Treasury had been the main shareholder of the
NIFs and delegated the members of the supervisory boards.
At that time, the state fully controlled the NIFs. Its owner-
ship share started to decrease when the process of
exchanging COs for NIF shares began6. The share of the
State Treasury decreased significantly at the end of 1998,
when the validity of certificates expired. At this point private
institutions started to acquire NIF shares more aggressively
and place their representatives on the NIFs' supervisory
boards. As of the beginning of 1999 the state continued to
hold only those shares which represented certificates not
redeemed by the citizens and shares reserved for remuner-
ation of the management firms7. Since that time the owner-
ship share of the state in the NIFs has been decreasing and
the Minister of the State Treasury has started to play a pas-
sive role in funds, acting rather as a regulatory and adminis-
trative body than the institutional shareholder of the funds8.
3. The Changes of Ownership Structure of the NIFs and the
Motives for Concentration
5 From March 1995, when the National Investment Funds were registered, to the end of 1998, when the distribution process of certificates of own-
ership finished and the privatization of the NIFs began in earnest.
6 Until the certificates of ownership were exchanged by the owners for shares of the NIFs, the State Treasury was entitled to exercise ownership
rights on behalf of the CO holders.
7 When the exchange process finished, almost 16% of the shares of NIFs remained in the State Treasury's hands (15% were reserved for remu-
neration of the management firms, and approximately 1% had not been redeemed by Polish citizens).
8 According to an  "unwritten agreement" the representatives of the Ministry of the State Treasury on the supervisory boards of the portfolio com-
panies and NIFs voted like the representatives of the leading shareholders. Only once did the state play a more active role in the NIFs. In 2000 it tried
with the support of PZU S.A., the largest state insurance company, to regain control over three funds managed by the Everest Capital Group. It suc-
ceeded in taking over two of these funds. The important message is that the Ministry of the State Treasury used market rather than administrative means
to accomplish its ends.
Figure 3.1. The ownership share of the State Trasury in NIFs
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Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG), Polish Press Agency (PAP), Notoria Service and own calculation.
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At the beginning of 2001 the state's share dropped to
13.4% (see figure 3.1). 
Analyzing the evolution of the ownership structure of the
NIFs we can observe a decreasing share of small, individual
investors. We define as small investors those investors who
own less than 5% of the shares in a single NIF. According to
the Law, such investors are not registered by the Polish Secu-
rity and Exchange Commission (KPWiG9). Just after the com-
pletion of the exchange process10 small institutional and indi-
vidual investors owned almost 50% of the shares of the NIFs.
By the beginning of 2001 the share of small and individual
investors had dropped to 41% (see figure 3.2). It should be
remembered that according to the NIF Law around 85% of
the shares of the funds were distributed to Polish citizens,
which means that the share of small investors was halved. 
While the share of the State Treasury and small investors
in NIFs has been decreasing, the share of institutional and
large investors has been rising (see figure 3.3). The share of
institutional investors11, starting at 0% in November
199512, jumped to 46% by the end of 2000.
CASE Reports No. 48
9 The Polish acronym, standing for Komisja Papierów Wartoœciowych i Gie³d.
10 31 December, 1998.
11 In the estimation presented we excluded the State Treasury in order to clearly show the concentration process and the involvement of the insti-
tutional, private investors.
12 In November the distribution of NIF shares started. As the certificates were fully transferable, institutional investors could now purchase them.
From the beginning of the distribution process Polish banks purchased COs from individual investors.
Figure 3.2. The ownership share of small investors  in NIFs
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Figure 3.3. The ownership share of large (institutional) investors in NIFs
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Analyzing the shareholdings of large investors we have
observed that foreign investors are the chief group responsi-
ble for the rapid increase in the involvement of large investors
in the Program. In June 1998 foreign investors had only 2.5%
of the shares of NIFs, but by January 2001 they had more than
26% of the shares, which constituted 57.5% of the total
shareholdings of large investors (see figure 3.4). At the same
time the shareholdings of Polish investors increased much less
significantly (see figure 3.5)13. In June 1998 Polish investors
held 4.1% of the NIF shares, and in January 2001 they held
only 13.5%. The largest involvement of Polish investors in the
NIFs was observed in the first two quarters of 1999, at which
time that category of investors held 16.5% of all shares. Later
their shareholdings started to decrease. Since September
2000, Polish investors have again started to increase their
shareholdings.
Analyzing the shareholding of large investors, we also
observe the increasing involvement of other NIFs. As of the
end of 2000 almost 6% of NIF shares were owned by other
NIFs. This cross-ownership mechanism also shows pro-
gressing concentration14. 
All the observed trends – the decreasing share of the
State Treasury and small investors, the increasing share of
institutional domestic and foreign investors and the growth
CASE Reports No. 48
13 Polish investors are defined here as economic units, in which domestic investors owned at least 51% of the share capital at the time when the
privatization of the funds started (i.e., when the distribution of COs started).
14 In fact the cross- ownership mechanism is a very effective and cheap tool of taking control over the funds. An investor controlling one fund uses
the financial sources of that fund to take control over another fund. As a result, investing in one fund, it controls two funds. This obviously speeds up
the concentration process. That mechanism will be described later in this paper.
Figure 3.4. The ownership share of large foreign investors in NIFs
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Figure 3.5. The ownership share of large domestic investors in NIFs
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of cross-ownership relations among the NIFs – reflect pro-
gressing ownership concentration. This observation is sup-
ported by the data presented in tables 1A and 2A (in the
appendix). Table 1A presents the concentration indexes C1
and C315 estimated for all NIFs together. Table 2A presents
C1 and C3 indexes estimated for all 15 NIFs separately.
Estimating the indexes in both cases we excluded the share-
holdings of the State Treasury in order to present and ana-
lyze the real ownership concentration of the private
investors.
Analyzing the evolution of C1 and C3 indexes for all
NIFs and comparing them with the Czech and Slovenian
examples16, we can say that the process of ownership con-
centration in the NIFs is progressing at quite an impressive
pace. Over a period of 2.5 years (from June 1998 to
December 2000) the C1 index increased from 5.41% to
almost 24%, and the C3 index increased from almost 7%
to 42%. The fastest rate of ownership concentration was
observed in 1999. 
These observations are supported by the data present-
ed in table 2A, where the evolution of C1 and C3 indexes
for all NIFs are presented separately17. The C1 index in
1998 varied from around 5% (in NIF IV and V) to more than
20% (NIF III). However, in most funds the shares of the
largest investor did not exceed 10%. Two years later the
lowest value of C1 was almost 14.5%, and the highest one
was almost 51%. In 8 funds (out of 1418) the C1 index
exceeded 20%. If we analyze the C3 index in the same
table the pace of the concentration process can be
observed even more clearly. In 1998 the C3 index varied
from around 15.5% to almost 40%. Only in two cases did
the C3 index exceed the level of 30%, and in most cases it
equaled around 20%. One year later C3 exceeded 40% in
6 funds (the highest value achieved was 51%, in NIF VI),
and in three others it exceeded 30%. The minimum value
of the index was 22.73%. In 2000 the C3 index reached
61% in NIF XV and 56.5% in NIF VI. For the next 10 NIFs
it was over 35%. 
Summing up the ownership situation of the NIFs, we see
the state with quite significant shareholdings (amounting to
15% of the shares) but a passive role as a shareholder, the
large number of small investors, and the quotation of NIFs
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (which requires quotation
liquidity). It seems that, depending on the level of a given
fund's concentration, control (direct and indirect) over
packages of shares of 30–40% ensures full control. Analyz-
ing the evolution of the C3 index, we observe that as early
as 1998 two funds had reached the level of concentration
ensuring such control (NIF III and IX19). In 1999 seven more
funds did so20, and in they were followed in 2000 by the
remaining six NIFs21. Thus, all NIFs have achieved the con-
centration level at which the three most important
investors own 30–40%, ensuring full and stable control
over the funds. 
CASE Reports No. 48
15 C1 is the share of the largest single shareholder; C3 is the combined share of the largest three shareholders.
16 See Simoneti et al. (2001) and Kocenda (2001).
17 As of the end of 1998, 1999, 2000. 
18 NIF III and NIF XI merged in 2000.
19 NIF III is controlled by the bank Pekao S.A. and NIF IX is controlled by the insurance company PZU S.A.
20 NIFs IV, V, VI, VIII, XI, XII, XV.
21 NIFs I, II, VII, X, XIII, XIV.
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The analysis of the data presented in table 2A not only
confirms the observation about the impressive pace of the
concentration process presented in the first part of this sec-
tion, but also gives rise to another very interesting hypothe-
sis. It seems that at present new entries into the NIFs are
only possible in the form of portfolio investments. If any
economic unit is interested in acting as a large and active
investor, it will have to buy a block of shares from another
large investor, as the purchase of shares on the market will
not yield a package of shares sufficient for control over the
fund22. 
3.2. The main investors in the National
Investment Funds
Table 3A (in the appendix) presents the main institution-
al investors on the NIF share market. We can divide them
into two groups. The first group includes the largest institu-
tional investors, who are interested in controlling the funds.
The second group includes the most active portfolio
investors. 
As of the end of 2000, we can identify the three most
active investors, who had taken control over the funds in the
group of large institutional investors. They were domestic
financial groups: two banks (BRE Bank and Pekao S.A.) and
one insurance company (PZU S.A.). These institutions have
directly or indirectly gained control over 11 funds. The
remaining four funds are controlled by foreign investors.
As of the end of 2000, PZU S.A., the largest Polish insur-
ance company, had become the most active and the most
effective investor on the NIF share market. The company is
currently undergoing privatization23. In three NIFs – II, IV
and IX – PZU directly or through its daughter company,
PZU Zycie S.A., owned significant packages of shares (see
table 4A in Appendix). The share capital of PZU in these
NIFs exceeded the level of 20%24. 
Since the end of 2000, PZU S.A. has also acquired con-
trol of NIFs X and VII. Previously these funds and NIF XIV
were controlled by Everest Capital Polska Sp. z o.o. How-
ever, the Ministry of the State Treasury negatively assessed
the activity of Everest Capital25 and tried to regain the con-
trol over these three funds. It used PZU S.A. to take the
control over these funds. As of the end of 2000, PZU S.A.
had gained almost 10% of shares in NIF X. In VII NIF PZU
had less then 5% of shares, but the State Treasury and
PZU's actions were openly supported by three foreign
financial institutions – Wood & Company, Deutsche Bank
and Arnhold & Bleichroeder26 – against the investors gath-
ered around Everest Capital. By January 2001 the insurance
group controlled, directly or indirectly, shares amounting to
almost 33% of the equity capital of NIF VII, and over 20 of
NIF X27. If we add to these shareholdings the shares under
control of the Ministry of the State Treasury28, we conclude
that PZU S.A. controlled almost 36% of the shares in NIF X
and almost 44% of the shares in NIF VII at that time. 
BRE Bank S.A. is the second most important and effec-
tive investor on the NIF share market. As of the end of 2000
BRE Bank, supported by Everest Capital Group, controlled
four funds: I, V, XIII and XIV (see table 5A in the appendix).
BRE controlled, directly or indirectly29, 26% of the shares in
NIF I and over 32% of the shares in NIF V. In NIF XIII BRE,
together with Everest Capital, controlled almost 40% of the
shares, and in NIF XIV, Everest Capital (supported by Poland
Opportunity Fund) controlled around 33% of the shares.  
The very close cooperation between BRE and Everest
Capital began in April 2000, when they decided to merge
their management firms. At that time BRE's management firm
managed three funds – I, V, XIII – and Everest Capital's man-
agement firm another three (VII, X, XIV). Thus, together they
controlled six funds (the ownership structure of these six
funds in January 2000 is presented in table 6A in the appen-
dix). However, because of the conflict in September 2000
between the State Treasury, supported by PZU S.A. and Ever-
est Capital30, they lost control over two NIFs (NIF VII and X),
though they managed to retain control over NIF XIV.
22 We will try to verify that hypothesis in the next part of the paper, where we analyze the present ownership structure of the NIFs.
23 30% of the shares were already sold by the Ministry of the State Treasury through direct sales to a consortium including a Polish private bank
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, BIG BG S.A. (which acquired 10%), and a Portuguese investor, the fifth largest insurance company in Europe
(EUREKO B.V., which acquired 20%). The remaining shares are under control of the Ministry of the State Treasury. The second stage of the privatiza-
tion (IPO and sale of the second tranche of the shares to a strategic investor) was supposed to be finished in 2001, but for political reasons the priva-
tization process was slowed down significantly, and it is unlikely that it will be completed in 2001.
24 20.2% in NIF II, 21.34% in NIF IV and 21.71% in NIF IX.
25 1999 net losses of NIF VII equaled 65% of the fund's equity, at NIF X they equaled 50% of the fund's equity and at NIF XIV 40.4%. 
26 In the opinion of several Polish capital market experts whom we interviewed during our research, these funds owned the shares on behalf of the
insurance company. This opinion was also presented several times in the press.
27 In these cases PZU also used the NIFs under its control to take control over NIF X and NIF VII. Analyzing table 4, we observe yet another exam-
ple of the usage of the cross-ownership relation mechanism described in section 3.1.
28 10.74% at NIF X and 15% at NIF VII.
29 That is, through the NIFs in its control (another example of the usage of the cross-ownership mechanism).
30 Supported by BRE.
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The third most active player on the NIF share mar-
ket is Pekao S.A., one of Poland's largest and most
dynamic banks31. Pekao S.A. is the largest institutional
shareholder in NIF Jupiter, which was created in March
2000, after the merger of NIF III and NIF XI. As of the
end of 1999, the shareholding of Pekao S.A. in these
two NIFs exceeded 30%. In January 2001 its capital
involvement in Jupiter amounted to almost 33% (see
table 7A in the appendix). 
There are four NIFs in which we can observe an active
and institutional capital involvement of foreign investors.
As of the end of 2000, Creditanstalt IB owned 54% of the
shares of NIF XV32 (see table 8A in the appendix). Allied
Irish Bank, directly or through Wielkopolski Bank Kredy-
towy – WBK S.A.33 and Bank Zachodni34, owned almost
22% of the shares of NIF VI. Two other foreign financial
institutions, Copernicus Investment Fund and NIF Fund
Holding, also had significant holdings in that NIF. Their
cumulative shareholdings in the NIF achieved the level of
around 35% by the end of 2000. These two financial insti-
tutions also controlled the last two funds (VIII and XII) at
that time. Together they held 32% and 26%, respective-
ly, of the shares in these two funds.
In the group of institutional portfolio investors the
three most active players are Deutsche Bank, CS First
Boston and Arnhold & Bleichroeder (see table 3A in the
appendix). As of the end of 2000 Deutsche Bank was the
most active among the portfolio investors. It had small
packages of shares35 in 8 NIFs. Interestingly, two years
earlier the Polish Security and Exchange Commission had
not registered it as a shareholder owning more than 5%
in at least one NIF. This is a stark contrast to CS First
Boston. As of the end of 1998, the latter was the most
active portfolio investor on the NIF share market, owning
9 small blocks of shares registered by the Commission.
However, at the beginning of 2000 it decreased its share-
holdings significantly, and by the end of 2000 it had only
small shareholdings in NIF IX.
When we examine the capital involvement of the
main investors on the NIF market, it appears that despite
the fact that large foreign investors own larger shares
capital in NIFs36, domestic investors use their sharehold-
ings more effectively. They control 11 funds, while for-
eign investors control only four. This indicates that Polish
investors have concentrated their shareholdings, focusing
on taking control over the funds. The data presented in
table 3A (see appendix) confirm this. While in 1998 PZU
S.A. had registered blocks of shares in 11 NIFs, in 2000 it
had shares in only 5 NIFs. However, in 2000 its share-
holdings in those NIFs were much greater. In contrast,
foreign investors (with a few exceptions) are rather
more interested in the role of portfolio investors. The
more active position of Polish investors in the NIFs can
be explained by the fact that domestic investors are
much more familiar with the institutional and administra-
tive framework of the NIF Program and can benefit much
more from controlling the funds. 
The analysis of the ownership structure of the NIFs and
the main investors also confirms the hypothesis formulated
in section 3.1 about the lack of space for entry of new large
institutional investors. The ownership structure of the NIFs
seems to be so concentrated, and current investors have
such strong position in the NIFs, that if any institution is
interested in entering the NIFs and acting as an active
investor, it will have to buy blocks of shares from the pre-
sent investors. 
3.3. The Motives for Share Consolidation
on the NIF Share Market
There are two possible motives for consolidation on the
NIF share market, which are driven by two potential
sources of benefits for large shareholders from controlling
the NIFs. First, shareholders can benefit from the increasing
value of the shares. Second, they can benefit from high asset
management fees, signing  management contracts with a
management firm, which is controlled by the same share-
holder or group of shareholders who control the fund. Ana-
lyzing the NIF share market, we have observed that the
shareholders of the funds mainly benefit from the profits
obtained from signing management contracts. As we will
show in more detail in the next section, the relatively very
high management fees paid to the management firms,
together with the incentive fees for financial performance,
constituted a significant part of the funds' financial base,
reaching up to 50% of the entire market value of their
assets during the years 1997–2000.
31 It was privatized in August 1999 by UniCredito Italiano SpA and Allianz Aktiengesellschaft. Foreign investors took over 52.09% of shares of the
bank.
32 It is interesting that the Austrian investor increased its shareholdings by 16 percentage points, exceeding the level of 50% in the NIF just after
the conflict between the Ministry of the State Treasury and Everest Capital started.
33 AIB has 60% of the shares of WBK.
34 AIB has 81% of the shares of Bank Zachodni S.A.
35 Blocks of shares exceeding the level of 5% and registered by the Polish Security and Exchange Commission.
36 See section 3.1.
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On the other hand, prices of NIF shares were system-
atically declining since their very good beginning on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange in May 1997. At the time of writ-
ing, the share prices are far below their book value. At the
end of 1997 the cumulative share price of all 15 NIFs37
amounted to 122.55 PLN. By the end of 1998, it had
decreased to 65.65 PLN, in 1999 it fell to 59.77 PLN, and
by the end of 2000 it had dropped to the level of 53.78
PLN. Very rare periods of increases in the shares' prices
resulted from conflicts among the main investors aimed at
taking control over the funds, or from short-term specu-
lative movements on the market. 
These data explain why shareholders are mainly inter-
ested in benefiting from the management contracts rather
than from the increasing value of NIF shares. Moreover, the
most active investors on the NIF share market have used
the synergy effect38 in order to maximize the profits of the
management firms and aimed at controlling more than one
fund.  These attempts constituted a very important factor
speeding up the consolidation and concentration process,
which was finally reflected in the changed ownership struc-
ture of the funds.
As was mentioned in section 2, the service fee for the
management firms consists of three parts: an annual fixed
fee for management services, an annual performance fee
for financial results (equal to 1% of the value of NIF
shares for each year of management services), and a final
performance fee for financial results (equal to 0.5% of the
value of NIF shares for each year of management ser-
vices). In the next section, we will show in more detail
that the fixed cash fee constituted the most important
(and increasing) part of the fund managers' remuneration.
In contrast, the success fee for financial and final perfor-
mance, which depends on the NIF share prices, has
always been an insignificant (and declining) part of the
management firms' remuneration, which does not stimu-
late the fund managers to increase the value of their NIFs. 
We therefore conclude that the shareholders of the NIFs
were mainly interested in signing management contracts
with controlled management firms and receiving manage-
ment fees. 
The historical evolution on the fund management mar-
ket and its present structure as well as the data presented in
table 10A (in the appendix) and table 3.1 also tend to con-
firm our hypothesis about the motives for consolidation of
NIF shares.
Initially NIFs signed management contracts with 14 man-
agement firms39 (see table 10A). Up to the end of 1998 the
supervisory boards, controlled mainly by the representa-
tives of the State Treasury, terminated six management con-
tracts40. At the end of 1998, when the validity of certificates
of ownership expired and the process of the NIFs' real pri-
vatization accelerated, the institutional investors started to
purchase significant blocks of shares and placed their repre-
sentatives on the supervisory boards, trying to take the full
control over them. As a result, in 1999 all NIFs had signed
management contracts with management firms.
37 That is, the sum of the prices of one share of each of the funds.
38 The management firms started to manage more than one fund, reducing fixed costs. In one case, for a few months in 2000, one management
firm managed 6 NIFs.
39 Only NIF IX did not sign the management contract.
40 In NIFs II, IV, VII, X, XI, and XIII.
Table 3.1. Main investors controlling NIFs as of the end of 2000 and the main management firms operating on the NIF market
Leading
Investors
PEKAO SA BRE PZU WBK AIB CA IB Copernicus/
NIF Fund
Holdings
NIFs
controlled by
leading
investors
NIF III
NIF XI
Merger in
march 2000
New NIF-
Jupiter
NIF I
NIF V
NIF XIII
NIF XIV
NIF II
NIF IV
NIF IX
NIF VI NIF XV NIF VIII
NIF XII
Management
firms
Trinity
Management
(the leading
shareholder-
PEKAO SA)
BRE Private
Equity
PZU NIF
Management
AIB WBL Fund
Management
CA IB
Management
KP Konsorcjum
Sp. z o.o.
Capital
involvement of
leading
investor
32.76% NIF I - 14.22%
NIF V - 14.97%
NIF XIII - 9.78%
NIF XIV - < 5%
NIF II - 20.20%
NIF IV - 21.34%
NIF IX - 21.71%
NIF VI - 21.57% NIF XV -
53.73%
NIF VIII - 32%
NIF XII - 25.5%
Source: CASE.
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3.4. The Most Active Management Firms 
In 1999 PZU S.A. was the most active player on the fund
management market. In 1999, its management firm PZU
NIF Management41 signed management contracts with
three (II, IV and IX) of the seven NIFs which did not have
management contracts. After signing the management con-
tracts with NIFs II and IV, the PZU Group increased its
shareholdings in these funds significantly. In NIF IV it did so
directly by increasing its shareholdings by almost 10 percent
and indirectly by another 9%, using other NIFs under its
control. All these steps were aimed at defending the posi-
tion of PZU on the supervisory boards and securing the
signing of management contacts with PZU NIF Manage-
ment.
Everest Capital Management Group was at that time the
second most active player on the fund management market.
It signed assets management contracts with two of the
remaining NIFs which had no signed management contracts
(VII and X). Additionally, in NIF XIV it managed to replace
International Westfund Holding management firm. In April
2000 Everest Capital merged with BRE/Cresco Manage-
ment Group42, and BRE Private Equity Management Group
was created43. Before the merger, BRE/Cresco manage-
ment firm had managed three NIFs: I, V and XIII.
BRE/Cresco had signed a contract with NIF I from the
beginning, and in NIF V it replaced the Kleinwort Benson
management firm44. NIF XIII had at that moment no signed
management contract. As a result, a newly created man-
agement firm managed six funds. However, as we already
noted, PZU, operating on behalf of and supported by the
Minister of the State Treasury, tried to regain control over
the funds managed by Everest Capital. In case of NIFs VII
and X, PZU with its supporters managed to take over a suf-
ficient number of shares and take control over the NIFs. As
a result, management contracts between Everest Capital
and these two NIFs were terminated45. However Everest
Capital and BRE retained control over NIF XIV. They man-
aged to buy enough shares on the market to block the
placement of PZU representatives on the supervisory
board and termination of the management contract. As of
the end of 2000 the management group BRE Private Equity
managed four NIFs: I, V, XIII and XIV. 
The third largest management firm is Trinity Manage-
ment Group46, which manages the largest NIF – Jupiter47.
Trinity Management Group signed an asset management
contract with NIF III in 1995 and with NIF XI in 1999. In NIF
XI we observed a significant increase of Pekao S.A. share-
holdings after signing the management contract: in one year
the bank doubled its shareholdings. 
The fourth largest management firm is KP Konsorcjum
Sp. z o.o.48. It manages two NIFs: VIII49 and XII. It is the only
case in which the main shareholders of the management
firm are not directly connected with the main shareholders
of the funds50. 
The two remaining funds are managed by management
firms which are directly connected with the main share-
holders. NIF VI is managed by AIB WBK Fund51, and NIF V
is managed by CA IB Management. These two funds have
not changed management firms. 
To sum up, the consolidation process of National Invest-
ment Funds shareholdings has been driven by the benefits
obtaining from the assets management contracts. The main
goal of the largest investors on the NIF market has been to
achieve and defend their dominant position on the supervi-
sory boards through acquiring sufficiently large shares in the
NIFs.  This, in turn, has allowed them to sign and to defend
a management contract with selected management firms52.
Additionally, the consolidation process was speeded up by
the synergy effect53 from managing more than one fund,
which has maximized the profits for the management firms.
41 50% of its shares are owned by PZU S.A. and 50% by PZU ¯ycie S.A., a life insurance company of which PZU S.A. owns 99.9%.
42 Cresco merged with the BRE Management Group in March 1999, a few days after BRE Management Group bought out 50% of the shares of
the Management Group from CA IB Investmentbank A.G. CA IB was represented in the management group by IB Austria Investment.
43 50% of the new management group was owned by BRE/Cresco and 50% by Everest Capital.
44 The second largest shareholder of Kleinwort Benson management firm was PBR – the Polish Development Bank, which was taken over by BRE
Bank. This eased the replacement of the management firm.
45 As of the end of 2000 new management firms were not chosen.
46 The shareholders of the management group are Pekao S.A. and Company Assistance Limited, a consultancy company established in 1991 in War-
saw by American and British consultants.
47 NIF Jupiter was created by a merger of NIF III and NIF XI.
48 Bank Handlowy holds 49.99% of the shares of KP Konsorcjum. 49.99% of the management firm is owned by KP International Ltd (KPI). The
shareholders of KPI are: Kennedy International (30%), York Trust (30%), and Central European Consultancy Services Ltd. (40%).
49 Since 1995.
50 Not counting NIFs which have no management contracts with management firms.
51 WBK owns 54% of shares of the fund, 26% AIB and 20% Nicom Consulting – Polish consulting company.
52 Controlled by the same investor.
53 Signing the managing contracts with more than one NIF by the same management firm.
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4.1. The Corporate Governance 
Structure of NIFs 
The main problem connected with the management of
the NIFs results from the very complicated corporate gov-
ernance structure of the funds. The division of tasks, rights
and obligations among the three management organs (man-
agement boards, supervisory boards, and contracted man-
agement firms) and the relations between them and the
State Treasury have been unclear from the beginning54. To
the typical continental two-tier governance structure of
joint stock companies (i.e., management board and supervi-
sory board), the NIF legislation added a third organ – a con-
tracted management company (firm)55. The idea behind this
was to provide the funds with highly qualified management
know-how from reputable Western firms, to ensure access
to capital and financial markets and to ease the search for
new investors for the NIF portfolio companies. Although
the responsibilities of the NIFs' management boards and
management firms were somewhat differentiated, their
activities in real life obviously had to be interwoven. This
required either their unification in one organ or the inclusion
of a clear division of tasks and responsibilities between them
in the NIF charters and in contracts signed with the man-
agement firms. The law provided three methods for resolv-
ing this question, but the response of the funds in most cases
was to nominate the same people to both organs (personal
union); in very rare cases they used the proxy option. This
guaranteed unified management activity at the fund level but
still did not resolve the problem of cooperation between
the management and supervisory boards. 
The supervisory boards of the NIFs were nominated in
an unusual way: In the first step a special selection commis-
sion (criticized for being strongly politicized56) chose poten-
tial candidates for fund supervisory board membership and
fund presidency. From this pool of candidates, the Minister
for Ownership Transformation (today the Minister of the
State Treasury) nominated the members and presidents of
the supervisory boards of all NIFs. The tenure of office of
each first supervisory board was set to expire at the time
when its fund gained other shareholders than the State Trea-
sury. The first supervisory boards received very broad rights
from the Treasury, including several rights normally reserved
for the shareholders. This was because the supervisory
boards had to represent the State Treasury in the manage-
ment of the funds. The State Treasury was initially the sole
owner of the NIFs' shares and felt responsible for the "well-
being" of the portfolio companies, which were formally held
by a very large group of Polish citizens. It therefore placed a
high priority on designing an appropriate fund management
structure, in order to protect the interests of the citizen-
shareholders.
This was the motivation for what became intensive day-
to-day interference of the State Treasury in the funds' activ-
ities, using different instruments, both formal and informal.
The State Treasury could use its ownership rights (directly
as the sole shareholder or indirectly through supervisory
boards of the funds and of the portfolio companies), could
undertake regulatory measures and was sometimes pre-
pared to use administrative methods too. This situation
made the position of supervisory board members very
ambiguous. While enjoying very broad rights in nominating
the management boards, choosing and signing contracts
with the management firms, and other strategic responsibil-
ities, at the same time they were fully dependent on the
decisions of the Ministry of State Treasury, being under its
direct control. On the other hand, the members of the NIFs'
supervisory boards, like their colleagues in other privatized
CASE Reports No. 48
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54 See Wawrzyniak et al. (1998).
55 However, employment of a management firm was not obligatory. The supervisory board could choose the classical management structure, with-
out the contracted firm. 
56 The commission consisted of 19 members: 5 members appointed by the parliament, 2 by the two largest trade unions and 12 appointed by the
Council of Ministers. The same commission made the primary selection of consortia that applied for the post of NIF management firms. The final selec-
tion of management firms was made by the supervisory boards of each NIF. 
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joint stock companies, sometimes failed to properly under-
stand the role of the supervisory board and tried to inter-
fere in the day-to-day management of the funds. 
The position of the fund managers became quite difficult,
as they were expected to conduct normal market-oriented
activity and make risky investment decisions, while at the
same time having limited power in day-to-day decisions and
being dominated by representatives of the government and
politicians. The lack of trust on both sides of the NIF manage-
ment organs probably resulted from the enormous differ-
ences between the organizational cultures that formed the
managers on the one hand and the members of the supervi-
sory boards on the other. The latter were economists, often
from academia, educated in communist Poland and supported
by certain political parties but in most cases having little or no
practical experience in financial issues and advanced manage-
ment methods. The representatives of the management firms
were usually experienced foreign financial market or invest-
ment specialists, coming from well-known international com-
panies, but with limited knowledge of the realities of a transi-
tion economy. It was difficult for both sides to find a common
language and to plan common activities in this unique and
experimental program. Additionally, the problem of mutual
understanding has deepened in those NIFs where the part-
ners from the management companies came from Anglo-
Saxon countries. They did not respect the authority of super-
visory boards to control management activities even to the
limited extent determined by the Polish Commercial Code.
On the other hand, the NIF Act empowered management
companies to create an investment strategy, and other actors,
including the supervisory board, had to respect their deci-
sions. All these regulations created a very confusing situation,
in which the mutual relations among the three NIF manage-
ment organs and the State Treasury had to be clarified day by
day in practice, often by the use of political power. This in turn
caused many conflicts and sometimes real battles, as well as
disappointments all round. It is therefore not surprising that in
such a situation each party tended first of all to secure its own
benefits from participating in the program. 
Since late 1998, the privatization of firms belonging to
NIFs began in earnest. Private investors started to acquire
shares of the portfolio companies in anticipation of the new
legal situation beginning in January 1999, when the State
Treasury no longer had majority power to control the funds'
activities. This resulted in an acceleration of the privatiza-
tion and consolidation process of the funds and changed
their ownership structure, as we noted above. But the first
three years after the funds' establishment were, to a large
extent, lost for efficient secondary privatization, because
mutual blocking mechanisms in the corporate governance
structure of the funds hindered any decisive activity on the
part of the fund management. The roles of different parties
in controlling the management of NIFs and their portfolio
companies are illustrated in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. The Scheme of Corporate Governance of the NIFs 
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20
B. B³aszczyk, M. Górzyñski, T. Kamiñski, B. Paczóski 
A second very important factor bearing on the overall
effects of NIF privatization consists in the number and par-
tially contradictory definition of tasks assigned to the funds.
Including in these tasks both the economic and financial
restructuring of portfolio companies and the privatization
and raising of the value of the NIFs' assets made it difficult to
realize all these goals simultaneously, at least in the short or
medium term. The funds were obliged to privatize the com-
panies (that is, sell them to new investors), prepare them for
future privatization (by restructuring them), or (in the worst
cases) liquidate the companies or initiate bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. There was political pressure from the State Trea-
sury as well as from the trade unions of portfolio companies
to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation of the companies,
though such measures were provided for under the NIF
Act. Often, there was also resistance from the portfolio
companies' unions and management against radical restruc-
turing. In effect, the restructuring activities of the funds,
insofar as they extended beyond changes in the manage-
ment boards of the portfolio companies, had a rather soft
and defensive character. In reality, the funds were not pre-
pared for strategic restructuring activities because of the
lack of fresh capital that would have had to be invested in
the enterprises. Some investment activities could be con-
ducted through redistribution of financial means among the
funds' portfolio companies or investing revenues from the
sales of such companies. But such investments in rather
poor companies were unlikely to be profitable. In connec-
tion with the restructuring task, one should note a frequent
lack of realism in the poor portfolio companies' expectations
toward the NIFs. They often hoped that the funds would
resolve all their problems, provide capital for investment
and give them access to new markets. On the other hand,
better portfolio companies had more realistic views and
expected, first of all, access to management know-how and
help in searching for new investors. But most companies'
managers objected to heavy influence of the funds on their
activities57. 
Some activities of the funds directed toward the
improvement of their own financial assets (which was one of
their main obligations under the contracts) were not neces-
sarily good for their portfolio companies and were some-
times blocked by the State Treasury. The funds tried to
invest their liquid assets outside the NIF system, but the tax
regulations and the new law on closed-ended investment
funds made these attempts impossible or unprofitable. The
Ministry felt responsible for the performance of the pro-
gram, and was especially interested in "restructuring before
privatization." It therefore tried to set limits on some of the
activities of the fund managers which were directed toward
quicker distribution of shares in portfolio companies. Long
lasting battles between the funds and the State Treasury on
the choice of "proper" strategies were endemic in the early
stage of the program, when the majority of shares were in
the hands of the state. 
Finally, it turned out that the NIF managers strongly pre-
ferred secondary privatization (i.e., sale to other investors) as
the main method of restructuring the portfolio companies.
On the basis of our research, we suspect that other kinds of
restructuring were not available in this concrete systemic
context. The difficulty was due to the huge needs of the
portfolio companies and the lack of financial means and
industrial restructuring know-how (the lack of "enterprise
doctors") at the fund level58. And it was probably not desir-
able due to the doubtful quality of the investment decisions
which would likely be made by players so strongly driven by
political forces. We believe that only certain types of new pri-
vate owners (those with long-term profit orientation and sig-
nificant decision-making authority) are able to improve the
performance of the NIF companies that are still "alive". How-
ever, our empirical material is too limited (short time series)
to allow for a conclusive answer to this question. 
The economic performance of the portfolio companies
has thus far been very unsatisfactory in comparison with
expectations. This is well illustrated by the systematically
declining prices of the funds since their very successful quota-
tion on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in May 1997. At the time
of writing, the shares are trading at far below their book
value. At the end of 1996 the total value of the NIFs was esti-
mated at 5.7 billion PLN (book value). By the end of 1997,
their market value had declined to 2.8 billion PLN (45% of
their book value)59, and by the end of 2000 to 1.8 billion
PLN60. Another measure of the same trend is the share of the
capitalization of all the NIFs61 in the total WSE (Warsaw Stock
Exchange) capitalization. Whereas in June 1998 this ratio had
reached 5.3%, by January 1999, it stood at 2.4%62 and in
December 2000 it had dropped to only 1.4%63.
One of the main research questions, to which we are at
this point only able to provide a partial answer, is the extent to
which the construction of this privatization scheme influenced
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57 See Kamiñski (2001).
58 This was predicted by T. Stankiewicz in his 1996 paper, in which he argued that the funds should focus on the privatization function, where they
can be efficient, and forget the restructuring function, where they cannot. See Stankiewicz (1996), and Petru (ed., 1996), 17. 
59 See Ministry of the State Treasury (1998).
60 See Ministry of State Treasury (2001). Data are as of 31 December, 2000.
61 This was the capitalization of funds and not their portfolio companies. 
62 See Górzyñski (1999). This figure was computed on the basis of Warsaw Stock Exchange data.
63 Own calculation on the basis of Warsaw Stock Exchange data and the Ministry of State Treasury (2001).
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the economic performance of the enterprises privatized
thereby. At this stage, it seems that the initial ownership struc-
ture of the NIFs, the associated corporate governance regime,
the financial situation of the funds and their regulatory envi-
ronment have not motivated fund management to engage in
restructuring activities in enterprises, but have rather encour-
aged sales and liquidations. This tendency has been strength-
ened by the management incentive system existing at the NIF
level (see the next section). At the same time, strong govern-
ment influence has hindered faster privatization of the NIF
portfolio companies and the consolidation activities of the
funds. The internal inconsistency of the NIF system, together
with the unfavorable conditions on the capital market, unfa-
vorable tax regulations and the activist stance of the State
Treasury, narrowed the scope of possible activities of the funds
and might be among the main reasons that the this program
has not lived up to expectations. 
4.2. The Management Costs of NIFs
Each NIF signed three contracts with a management
firm, of which the most important is the contract for the
management of the NIF's assets signed for a 10-year period.
This contract, based on the NIF Act and the individual char-
ters of each NIF, regulates the manner in which assets are
managed by management firms, the relationship with man-
agement board and supervisory board, and details on proxy
rights, duties and responsibilities for the running of the com-
pany. Most importantly, it determines the annual flat cash
fee for management services, which is defined in the NIF
Act. This fee theoretically depends on the number of port-
folio companies, and was originally agreed to range from 2.5
to 3 million USD yearly for each NIF64.
The price of the several hundred state-owned enterpris-
es that took part in the NIF Program was not fixed. Howev-
er, the State Treasury and supervisory boards of the funds had
at least some idea about the worth of their property when
they negotiated the fees for the management firms. The book
value of the net assets of 509 out of the 512 NIF companies
amounted to 10.9 billion PLN in 1995, whereas the net assets
of 492 companies for the year 1996 were estimated at 10.3
billion PLN65. Because only 60% of the shares of leading
companies was contributed to the funds, we may estimate
that the NIFs were provided by the Ministry of the State
Treasury with net assets worth about 6.5 billion PLN66. 
The book value of the net assets of the NIFs on 31
December 1996, when they had acquired all portfolio com-
panies and their balance sheets had been reviewed, was
estimated at 5.7 billion PLN67 (according to other sources,
the value of the assets of the 512 portfolio companies
equaled about 7 billion PLN68).
Initial simulations of the entire remuneration for the man-
agement firms (based on the assumption that original program
parameters such as the number of NIFs, the exchange rate,
etc., would remain unchanged) yielded a figure of 2.7 billion
PLN (including the annual flat cash fees totaling 1.2 billion PLN
and the annual and final performance fees totaling 1.5 billion
PLN)69. This was a very generous decision, given the fact that
the sum which management firms could hypothetically earn
constituted almost half (45%) of the managed assets. Addition-
ally, it was clear from the beginning that the fixed element of the
total fee (the annual flat cash fee) was too large relative to the
remuneration for financial performance (yearly and final),
potentially distorting the incentive system for fund managers. 
The actual costs of management, however, far exceeded
even these expectations. Table 4.1 illustrates the total man-
agement costs for all NIFs for the years 1995–2000, broken
down into annual flat cash fees and additional fees for financial
performance. We can see from the table that, as of the end of
2000, the total amount spent on management services in the
NIFs exceeded the huge sum of 756 million PLN, equaling
42.4% of the entire capitalization of the funds (see also table
4.3). The relative significance of the fees for financial perfor-
mance in the entire remuneration of the fund managers was
remarkably low. Detailed data on the management costs of
each of the 15 NIFs, broken down by the types of fees, are
shown in table 11A in the appendix.
It is interesting to look at the relative proportions of the
different types of fees during the implementation of the
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64 The second agreement, signed trilaterally by a fund, a management company and the Ministry of the State Treasury, is a contract concerning fees
for financial efficiency and regulates mutual relations among the parties pertaining to extra fees for financial performance (an annual performance fee
and a final performance fee) amounting to 15% of the market value of the fund's shares over a ten-year period. The last one – the global contract –
signed by the same parties, defines the relations among them until such time as the share of the Ministry of the State Treasury drops below 75%.
65 Authors' own calculation.
66 That is, 60% of the 10.9 billion PLN worth of assets contributed by the State Treasury in the form of portfolio companies.
67 See Ministry of the State Treasury (1998).
68 See Kostrz-Kostecka (1995), p. 23. 
69 The calculation was based on the following assumptions: an annual flat cash fee of 8 million PLN per fund (with a fixed exchange rate) for man-
agement services, a maximum number of 15 funds hiring management firms, a period of 10 years for which the original agreements were signed, net
assets introduced to the program in fixed price equal to on average 6 billion PLN. Thus, we have:
· annual flat cash fee: 8 million PLN x 15 funds x 10 years = 1.2 billion PLN,
· annual and final performance fee for financial performance: 6.0 billion x (15%/60%) = 1.5 billion PLN, yielding a total of 2.7 billion PLN.
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program. In 1997 the total fee for financial performance and
final performance equaled, on the average, around 41% of
the fixed cash fee for management services (see table 4.2)71.
In 1998, as the price of NIFs' shares started to decrease, that
ratio decreased to the level of 28%. In 1999 and 2000 it
dropped even lower, to the level of 23%, demonstrating the
increasing significance of the fixed portion of the manage-
ment firms' remuneration. We do, however, observe some
differences in this respect between the funds. 
Table 4.3 shows the ratio of the total management costs
of the management firms to the capitalization of the funds,
calculated on the basis of average yearly prices in the years
1997–200072. As this table is broken down by 1473 NIFs, we
can see this ratio separately for each NIF, as well as the dif-
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Table 4.1. The management costs of the management firms (in millions of PLN)70
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Sum of
annual flat
fees
Extra fees for
financial
performance
Global fee
Total yearly fees
for all NIFs
44 112 120 115 119 115 627 128 756
Source: own calculation on the basis of Warsaw Stock Exchange: annual financial reports of NIFs.
Table 4.2. Ratio of the total performance fees to the annual fixed cash fee for services of management firms 1997–2000
1997 1998 1999 2000
Max. value of the ratio NIF XIV - 52% NIF XIV - 38% NIF VIII - 33% Jupiter- 42%
Min. value of the ratio NIF V - 25% NIF XV - 21% NIF XV - 11% NIF XII - 11%
Average value of the ratio 41% 28% 23% 23%
Source: own calculations on the basis of Warsaw Stock Exchange: annual financial reports of NIFs
Table 4.3. The ratio of the yearly management fees of management firms and of the global fees for the entire period to the average
yearly price capitalization of the funds (1997–2000) 74 
NIF 1997 1998 1999 2000 Global fee 75
NIF I 9.1% 20.3% 41.2% 51.1% 59.0%
NIF II 4.2% 7.4% 18.2% 31.7% 36.9%
Jupiter 5.5% 10.5% 27.3% 22.8% 29.3%
NIF IV 6.4% 13.5% 20.6% 32.9% 41.6%
NIF V 13.3% 24.8% 34.4% 66.6% 74.1%
NIF VI 9.2% 18.8% 25.2% 40.7% 48.9%
NIF VII 9.7% 17.2% 31.7% 47.5% 54.4%
NIF VIII 6.3% 12.8% 16.8% 18.3% 26.6%
NIF IX 1.0% 1.4% 4.8% 9.3% 12.3%
NIF X 4.3% 8.1% 16.5% 25.8% 33.3%
NIF XII 8.2% 17.6% 45.2% 83.0% 91.3%
NIF XIII 6.0% 14.4% 27.0% 47.2% 55.4%
NIF XIV 6.0% 12.7% 22.0% 34.4% 42.7%
NIF XV 7.9% 19.5% 41.4% 62.3% 70.7%
Average 6.9% 14.2% 26.6% 41.0% 48.3%
TOTAL 6.6% 13.4% 25.3% 35.2% 42.4%
Source: own calculations on the basis of Warsaw Stock Exchange: annual financial reports of NIFs.
70 These costs include the NIFs' costs of financial advising in the years 1995–2000 and the extra fees for financial performance owed to manage-
ment companies for the years 1995–2000.
71 The value of the success fee element of management company remuneration (i.e., fee for financial and final performance), is equal to a stated
percentage of the NIF's share prices at the time the fee is paid. It should be stressed that the fees for financial performance owed to the management
firms, regardless of whether they were paid yet or not, constitute expenses on the budget of the State Treasury but are not visible on the balance sheets
and income statements of the funds.
72 The average yearly price capitalization of a fund equals the average yearly price of a fund's share multiplied by the average number of fund shares
issued. 
73 Due to the fact that NIF III and NIF XI were merged to form NIF Jupiter.
74 The management fees include financial advising costs; global fees include performance fees.
75 Including fees for financial performance for the entire period.
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ferences among them. While, as noted above, the ratio of
total management costs of all funds to their total capitaliza-
tion was 42.4%, the average ratio calculated for one fund
was 48.3%, showing that some funds had very high costs in
relation to their capitalization. Indeed, we can see that NIF
XII had a ratio as high as 91.3% and NIF V one of 74.1%.
We also note that the only fund in which the ratio of total
management costs to capitalization did not exceed 15%
was NIF IX, which was the only NIF that was not run by a
management firm. This fact shows that the use of contract-
ed management companies was very expensive business for
the program.
Moreover, management fees were not adjusted down-
ward to reflect the falling levels of actual costs to the man-
agement firms. For example, until 1999, the annual flat fees
of the management firms were not adjusted to reflect the
decreasing numbers of companies under the funds' manage-
ment (because of their sale to other investors, liquidation or
bankruptcy). Similarly, the consolidation of funds, which
placed more than one fund under the supervision of one
management firm, did not influence the amount of the fee.
Currently, a small number of management companies are
managing the funds (in particular, as we showed in section
3.4, two firms are managing seven funds). We can conclude
from this that the initial number of funds was too high and
economically unjustified. In the case of several management
firms, strong efforts undertaken to privatize a large number
of companies (about which we will have more to say in the
next section) may explain their management costs. Indeed,
we have found that the correlation between the manage-
ment costs and the number of companies sold and/or
placed at the public market is positive, significant and high
(0.59, or 0.49 if we take into account liquidations as well).
However, there is not yet sufficiently convincing evidence76
that the funds that had the highest management costs were
the most efficient in privatizing their portfolio companies.
A short overview of the ratio of management costs to
capitalization of the funds is given in figure 4.2 below. Ana-
lyzing the data shown in the tables above and in figure 4.2,
we see clearly that the management costs of the funds may
soon consume the entire value of their assets. The conclu-
sion is quite obvious – in the second half of the program's
life (planned for ten years), unless there is an unusual
growth in the price of fund shares or a radical reduction in
managers' fees, the management costs will exceed the mar-
ket value of the managed property. In this situation it is very
likely that the NIF Program will be concluded sooner than
planned, if possible*.
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that we do
not blame the management firms and their private share-
holders for this situation. They have been acting within the
framework of the rules set by the law and have engaged
their resources in the acquisition of fund shares in order to
maximize profits. But the existing legal and regulatory
framework made those profits much easier to achieve
through high management fees than through other more
risky activities. From the beginning, the incentive system of
the NIF management had weak points, such as the high
fixed fees which were not proportionate to costs and inde-
pendent of performance, the unclear corporate governance
structure of the funds and the lack of any effective mecha-
nism for punishing bad management. There were not
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76 Due to the shortness of the time series available.
* Recently, we noted many press signals that the NIFs plan to acquire packages of their own shares as large as allowed by the law, in order to liq-
uidate themselves ahead of schedule.
Figure 4.2. Management firms' global fees through the year 2000 and the average yearly price capitalization of the funds
in the year 2000 (in million zlotys)
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enough incentives for the managers to increase the value of
the funds' assets during the period of State Treasury owner-
ship domination. Following withdrawal of the State Trea-
sury, the situation in this respect became even worse,
because the new shareholders of the funds were also the
main shareholders of the management firms and were thus
interested in minimizing the value of the funds during the
time in which they were acquiring shares in them.
During the first two to three years of the NIF Program,
investors had a positive attitude toward it. This was reflect-
ed in the high expectations concerning the development of
the funds' portfolio companies and the high share prices of
funds. As they observed the actual activities of the funds and
their high management costs, however, investors became
more and more disappointed, which was reflected in the
constantly declining share prices. No one had foreseen that
a multitude of negative signals would create an aura of
doubt and distrust around the whole program on the part
of investors. This has caused a collapse of fund share prices
in the recent years, which has further deteriorated the neg-
ative atmosphere. The greatest disappointment with the
declining value of NIF assets and shares is for the small
shareholders who decided not to sell their NIF shares but
to keep them, with the expectation that this portion of the
national assets would increase in value.
All this was not predicted by the reformers and legisla-
tors who wrote and passed the NIF Act. They tried rather
to resolve all systemic issues in the law than to establish a
proper incentive system and a consistent governance struc-
ture that would encourage the sorts of activities they were
hoping the NIFs would engage in. In general, the experience
of the funds proved again that a law cannot be designed to
account for all aspects of the activity of economic systems
as complicated as the funds. Nevertheless, we would add
that because the program was a pioneering undertaking,
not all of the problems that appeared could have been pre-
dicted. 
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5.1. Initial Restructuring Attempts
At the start of the NIF program all funds declared their
intentions as to what kind of restructuring policy they would
implement. They differed in their approaches to the ques-
tion of whether to sell their portfolio companies and when.
Some funds planned to establish large capital groups around
the NIF companies which could later be transformed into
holding companies77. Other funds wanted to play the role of
venture capital funds and treated their control of the port-
folio companies as a temporary activity, declaring that their
chief goal was to gain profits from the sale of attractive com-
panies to other owners. Yet another group of NIFs empha-
sized the diversification of their portfolios.
The expectations of the portfolio companies themselves
played a minor role in the formulation of funds' strategies.
These companies were highly differentiated, especially with
respect to their economic standing, and their expectations
with respect to the funds depended largely on whether they
were in relatively good or relatively poor financial shape.
Weak enterprises were hoping for the funds to support
them by solving their financial and management problems.
These companies wanted the funds to find them strategic
investors or support in the privatization process. They also
wanted the management firms to facilitate access to credit
and markets. This group seems to have relied excessively on
the funds to take initiatives that would improve their condi-
tion, and their expectations were largely disappointed. 
The second, more "independent" attitude was charac-
teristic for companies in good financial condition. Such com-
panies were participating in the NIF program mainly with
the hope that it would facilitate contacts with strategic
investors and allow them to obtain credits guarantees. Gen-
erally speaking, the better performers wanted minimal
interference of the NIFs in their activities, and rather looked
only for the funds to help them in exploring new strategic
directions and sometimes to help in finding instruments that
would allow them to move in those directions. The antici-
pation that the funds would be able to play such a role was
their most important motivation to stay in the program.
In the first two to three years of the funds' operation,
they were able to directly or indirectly conduct programs of
limited organizational restructuring that were similar in all
companies ("restructuring without expenditures"). Person-
nel changes in the boards of directors were very frequent78.
Additionally, most companies introduced strategic planning
and marketing plans. New bookkeeping systems were intro-
duced and new departments established (mainly in the com-
mercial and marketing areas), and the accompanying train-
ing carried out. Defensive changes, in form of "extracting"
service and other independent units from the companies'
structures, were also made. Changes in employment were
also frequent (first reduction, later stabilization). But the
shortage of fresh investment capital became a serious barri-
er for any deeper restructuring process in the companies. 
The only way for the companies to escape from this
"holding position" was sale to other investors. Some fund
managers understood this and accelerated their efforts in
this direction. The results of these efforts are presented in
detail in the next section.
5.2. Privatization Activity: A Relative
Success of the National Investment Funds
The main aim of this section is to answer the question
whether the NIF Program accelerated the privatization
process in Poland. In order to do this we try to compare the
privatization efficiency – i.e., the quantitative privatization
results – of the National Investment Funds (NIFs) and the
Ministry of the State Treasury (MST) (in the case of the lat-
ter, we will deal with indirect privatization only). We are
interested in trying to answer the question whether trans-
77 See The Stock Exchange Almanac 2000, published by Parkiet – Gazeta Gie³dy.
78 See Kaminski (2001), Wawrzyniak et al. (1998).
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ferring the authority to privatize over 500 companies from
the ministry to the NIFs was an effective privatization strat-
egy. Without the National Investment Funds Program, the
State Treasury companies participating in it would most like-
ly have been indirectly privatized by the Ministry of the State
Treasury through its so-called capital privatization path (pri-
vate sale or public offering). 
There are a number of arguments for making such a com-
parison of NIF privatization and MST indirect privatization:
1. Use of the same or similar privatization methods. 
2. The same legal status of the companies (so-called
commercialized companies, no longer operating under the
1981 State Enterprise Act, but under the Commercial
Code).
3. The similar size and branch structure of the compa-
nies (excluding infrastructure and heavy industry).
Both groups have experienced similar problems with
respect to privatization. First, there are not enough domes-
tic and (interested) foreign investors with sufficient capital
for covering the costs of restructuring the companies. Sec-
ond, the costs of privatization of certain companies are too
high. Another vital aspect is the political dimension. The
atmosphere of public debate on privatization, charged with
suspicion and mutual accusations, has made privatization in
Poland relatively difficult, both for the NIFs and for the MST. 
For instance, the case of Tormiês (a meat factory in
Toruñ) was widely discussed. Although Tormiês' liabilities
exceeded its assets, and the company went finally bankrupt,
Foksal NIF (NIF X) invested a few million PLN in the com-
pany due to social and political pressure. However, it seems
that the more privatized the funds became, the less atten-
tion they paid to political pressure and the more they paid
to economic efficiency.
In contrast, the MST is still under the strong influence of
political factors. At present, there are whole branches of the
economy where privatization has barely started (e.g., the
mining industry, the sugar industry, and the spirit industry),
and the delays are due to strong pressures exerted by trade
unions, farmers' organizations and other lobbies. The recent
two-week occupation of the minister's office by a member
of parliament from the agrarian lobby shows that not much
has changed in this respect.
The strategies of the NIFs may also slow down the pri-
vatization of the companies participating in the NIF Pro-
gram. Out of the five available strategies (privatization,
restructuring, consolidation, investment and liquidation),
only two (privatization and liquidation) directly speed up the
privatization process. The strategy of investment may influ-
ence the pace of privatization because thanks to it a given
fund obtains the capital necessary for new projects. On the
CASE Reports No. 48
Table 5.1. The effects and efficiency of the privatization of the NIFs and the Ministry of the State Treasury (1996–2000)
No. Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1 Number of commercialized and not privatized
companies held by MST
404 558 624 698 727
2 Number of companies indirectly privatized by
MST, of which:
24 44 16 18 21
3 sold to domestic investors 3.960% 3.943% 0.962% 1.433% 0.963%
4 sold to foreign investors 1.485% 1.613% 0.641% 0.287% 1.100%
5 sold to private entrepreneurs 0.248% 0.717% 0.160% 0.860% 0.688%
6 publicly traded 0.248% 1.613% 0.801% 0.000% 0.138%
7 Privatization efficiency of MST (2/1) 5.941% 7.885% 2.564% 2.579% 2.889%
8 Number of commercialized and not privatized
companies held by NIFs
512 495 425 324 261
9 Number of companies privatized by NIFs, of
which:
17 70 101 63 26
10 sold to domestic investors 1.758% 6.465% 11.529% 9.568% 4.981%
11 sold to foreign investors 1.172% 3.434% 4.941% 2.469% 1.533%
12 sold to private entrepreneurs 0.391% 1.616% 4.941% 6.790% 3.448%
13 publicly traded 0.000% 2.626% 2.353% 0.617% 0.000%
14 Privatization efficiency of NIF (9/8) 3.320% 14.141% 23.765% 19.444% 9.962%
15 Ratio of NIF privatization efficiency to MST
privatization efficiency (14/7), of which:
55.9% 179.3% 926.8% 754.0% 344.9%
16 for companies sold to domestic investors (10/3) 44.4% 164.0% 1199.1% 667.8% 517.3%
17 for companies sold to foreign investors (11/4) 78.9% 212.9% 770.8% 861.7% 139.3%
18 for companies sold to private entrepreneurs (12/5) 157.8% 225.5% 3083.3% 789.9% 501.4%
19 for publicly traded companies (13/6) 0.0% 162.8% 293.6% --------- ---------
Source: own calculation on the basis of the Ministry of the State Treasury, Dynamika Przekszta³ceñ W³asnoœciowych.
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other hand, the strategies of restructuring and consolida-
tion, used together, cause the slowing of privatization
because the firms are retained for a longer period of time.
No matter what the chosen strategy or the economic and
political situation of the funds is, privatization is also greatly
influenced by the policies employed by the NIFs, which are
not fully revealed to public opinion. In the majority of cases (as
we have shown) the management companies charge very high
fees for running the funds – fees which are unjustified in com-
parison to the value of the managed property. From the point
of view of the owner of a management company, who is usu-
ally also an owner of the fund, there are no rational reasons
for the quick privatization of the portfolio companies, which
would hasten the liquidation of the fund, depriving the share-
holders of the management company of huge incomes. This
fact may have an influence on the way the strategies are car-
ried out, especially the strategy of privatization and the selec-
tion of companies to undergo privatization. 
A similar problem may appear in privatization by the
MST. On the one hand, the ministry is urged to improve the
economy, to increase the competitiveness of enterprises
and, most of all, to provide the state with budget revenue.
On the other hand, the ministry is afraid to lose its power
and the seats on boards of directors and supervisory boards
which can be distributed to political supporters, as this
would lead to the loss of status for the ministry. Such an atti-
tude may lead to economic irrationality and a lack of objec-
tivity in making certain decisions, and, consequently, to
slowing down the pace of privatization.
Bearing the above considerations in mind, we will com-
pare the quantitative effects and efficiency of privatization of
the NIFs with those of the MST by comparing the ratio of the
number of companies privatized in one year by an entity to
the total number of companies held at the end of the year by
the same entity. The pool (total number) of companies held by
each of the two entities (MST or NIFs) is made up of the com-
mercialized companies which have not yet been privatized
(and are potentially available for privatization). In order to
compare the new ownership structure of the companies pri-
vatized by NIFs and the MST, we divided up the privatized
companies by the type of the new investor in the following
way. The types of investors included domestic corporate
investors, foreign investors, private individuals and public trad-
ing (stock exchange and over-the-counter market).
Table 5.1 shows clearly that, apart from the year 1996
(the first year of the program), the privatization efficiency of
the NIFs in each year and in each of the selected categories
greatly exceeded the privatization efficiency of the MST.
The smallest differences were generally those for publicly
traded companies, which can be explained by the high costs
and lengthy procedures of IPOs. In the remaining group of
investors the difference amounts to several hundred per
cent or even more. 
Figure 5.1 shows the structure of the differences in
the ratio of NIF privatization efficiency to MST privatiza-
tion efficiency in the examined years by investor type.
Apart from the singular great increase in the share of pri-
vatization for private individuals in 1998 (which was
caused by the low efficiency of MST privatization in that
year and investor category) and the singular decrease in
the share of privatization for foreign investors in 2000
(which was caused by the low efficiency of NIFs), the
structure of differences in the ratio of privatization effi-
ciency between NIFs and MST is relatively stable. It is
striking that NIF efficiency, both in absolute terms and
relative to MST privatization efficiency, reached a peak in
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Figure 5.1. Differences in the ratio of NIF privatization efficiency to MST privatization efficiency (1996–2000)
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1998. It was in this year that the privatization of the funds
started and representatives of private owners appeared
for the first time on the boards of the funds. For these
reasons, less attention started to be paid to political and
social factors and much more to economic ones. Even if
the strategies were not totally pro-privatization, the funds
had to consider privatization as a means of obtaining the
revenues necessary to continue the strategies they had
started. Since 1999, in which privatization and bankruptcy
exceeded the critical amount equal to half of the compa-
nies held, privatization efficiency has been decreasing. We
can, moreover, hypothesize that privatization will contin-
ue to slow down over the next few years due to the
aforementioned factors – i.e., the unwillingness of the
funds to liquidate quickly, the continuation of restructur-
ing strategies and the continually decreasing number of
companies available for privatization. In conclusion, we
can answer the question posed at the beginning of this
section positively: the introduction of the NIF program
made it possible to accelerate the privatization of state-
owned companies considerably for a few years. However,
internal barriers that appeared in the program because of
its incentive system have slowed down this pace again. 
5.3. The NIFs' Privatization Strategies
and Their Market Prices
Privatization strategies result in negotiated sales of com-
panies to selected investors, the quotation of companies on
public markets, bankruptcy and liquidation. All of these
effects make up the privatization activity of NIFs. In order to
determine the relationship between the particular funds'
strategies and the market price of the funds' shares, we
compare NIF privatization strategies to determine the
nature of the correlation between privatization effects and
the real price of fund shares79.
We observe from table 5.2 that the greatest number of
companies (as many as 134 by the end of 2000) were sold
by NIFs to domestic corporate investors. In contrast, con-
siderably fewer companies (about 60 in each category) were
sold to foreign investors and private individuals, declared
bankrupt or liquidated. The smallest number (only 25) was
quoted on the public market80. The fastest increase in the
rate of divestiture in the years 1998–1999 took place in the
categories of domestic corporate investors and private indi-
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79 The real price of the funds' shares is defined as the ratio of the average yearly price of a fund share to the average yearly index of funds' share
prices (called NIF) on the public market.
80 In fact, 36 companies were quoted on the public markets. However, in some of them NIFs sold the largest blocks of shares to strategic investors.
Such companies were included in the category reflecting the type of strategic investors. 
81 Including employees.
Table 5.2. The effects of NIF privatization strategies and correlation between privatization effects and the real price of funds
(1996–2000)
NIF
Number
of
companies
Domestic
corporate
investors
Foreign
investors
Private
individuals81
Public
market
Bank-
ruptcy and
liquidation
Privatiza-
tion
activity
Real
Price
NIF I 35 10 2 5 5 5 27 0.057
NIF II 34 8 2 6 2 5 23 0.059
NIF III/Jupiter 34 13 3 5 2 6 29 0.072
NIF IV 35 11 3 3 0 2 19 0.069
NIF V 35 11 2 6 0 1 20 0.055
NIF VI 35 5 6 6 2 3 22 0.067
NIF VII 34 2 1 2 0 5 10 0.049
NIF VIII 34 10 5 4 0 7 26 0.079
NIF IX 34 8 7 3 2 4 24 0.084
NIF X 33 5 3 2 2 2 14 0.062
NIF XI/Jupiter 33 12 6 1 6 3 28 0.075
NIF XII 33 13 2 3 0 2 20 0.056
NIF XIII 34 11 4 5 1 4 25 0.069
NIF XIV 34 8 4 5 3 1 21 0.076
NIF XV 35 7 6 6 0 2 21 0.069
Total 512 134 56 62 25 52 329 1
Correlation 0.2559423 0.8207247 -0.0676051 0.218824 0.1302656 0.5644276
Source: own calculation on the basis of the Ministry of the State Treasury, Dynamika Przekszta³ceñ W³asnoœciowych, and data from Parkiet-Gazeta
Gie³dy
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viduals; growth was slower in the categories of foreign
investors and public quotations.
The leaders in privatization activity from the beginning
have been NIF III and NIF XI (later merged to form one
fund, Jupiter). NIF VI and NIF IX were keeping up with
them until 1999, when its activity slowed considerably. NIF
I, however, increased remarkably, catching up with the
leaders. These funds sold from 20 to 25 companies and
bankrupted 3–6 companies, which left them with 5–8 com-
panies, 15% of the original 33–35. The shares of different
investor categories do not differ considerably from the
average. The only exceptions are NIF IX, which sold the
largest number of companies (seven) to foreign investors,
and NIF XI, with a record number of six companies quoted
on the public market. It is also clear that the leaders have
started the greatest number of bankruptcy and liquidation
proceedings.
The least active "marauders" since the beginning of
privatization have been NIF VII and NIF X. In 1999 they
were almost joined by NIF XII, which practically stopped
its activity. NIF V left this group, having doubled the num-
ber of sold companies in 1999. These funds sold from 5
to 12 companies, bankrupted 2–5 companies, and were
left with 19–24 companies, i.e. 56–70% of the original
33–34. In this group the share of investors differs greatly
from the average. All funds of this group were unwilling
or unable to make IPOs or bankrupt or liquidate their
companies. (An exception here is the least active fund,
NIF VII, which sold only five companies, but bankrupted
five.)
The analysis of the correlation presented in table 5.282
shows a very strong positive relationship between the
real price of a fund share on the one hand and the num-
ber of companies sold to foreign investors (cf. the high
real price of NIF VIII, NIF IX and NIF XI and the low real
price of NIF I, NIF V, NIF VII and NIF XII) on the other.
There is also a positive correlation between the real price
and the number of companies quoted on the public mar-
ket (cf. the high real price of NIF IX, NIF XI and NIF XIV
and the low real price of NIF V and NIF VII), the number
of companies sold to domestic investors (cf. the high real
price of NIF III, NIF VIII and NIF XI and the low real price
of NIF VII and NIF X) and the total privatization activity
of funds (cf. the high real price of NIF III, NIF VIII, NIF IX
and NIF XI and the low real price of NIF V, NIF VII, NIF
X and NIF XII).
We conclude, therefore, that the capital market places a
premium on funds whose privatization strategies put special
emphasis on selling companies to foreign investors and, to a
lesser extent, selling companies to domestic investors and
quoting them on the public markets. This is due to the fact
that foreign investors are willing to pay large sums for the
companies that interest them, sometimes much more than
companies' value as reflected in its balance sheet. Such
spectacular transactions undoubtedly help to improve the
image of the funds. The less significant relationship, as the
effect of lower prices paid for companies, is found in the
case of domestic investors. Companies quoted on the pub-
lic market are usually among the best ones. This policy of
the funds makes it easier to price them, increases their
transparency and makes them more attractive to investors.
It also provides effective promotion and advertisement, let-
ting them maintain friendly relations with investors. Finally,
it seems that the capital market rewards a high rate of pri-
vatization activity, which is reflected in the higher prices of
the funds' shares.
5.4. The New Owners of the NIF 
Companies and the Structure of Their
Shareholdings
The most important observation concerning the NIFs'
activities in recent years is that they are active in searching
for new owners for their portfolio companies. As of Decem-
ber 2000, over a half of these companies (278) have found
new investors, including companies quoted on the stock
exchange (27) or over-the-counter market (12). In addition,
78 companies were under bankruptcy or liquidation proce-
dures (of which nine have already been liquidated at the time
of writing). In all, secondary privatization has affected, in our
estimation, 330 firms83. Some of them have mixed struc-
tures; for instance, part of the shares of a company with an
active shareholder may be traded on the stock exchange. In
57 firms, foreign investors have appeared. In 89 companies
the State Treasury share has been reduced to zero84. 
In analyzing the funds' activity in this area, we have
applied two criteria: first, the number of firms sold; second,
the number of firms sold in 1999 and 2000 (here the inten-
tion is to measure what has happened to the pace of sec-
ondary privatization in recent years). The number of NIF
firms sold is shown in table 5.3.
Each NIF sold between 5 and 23 of its portfolio compa-
nies to investors. The least active NIFs in this area were NIF
CASE Reports No. 48
82 These results are confirmed by correlations (not presented here) for each of three earlier periods (1996–1997, 1996–1998, 1996–1999) ana-
lyzed separately.
83 It is difficult to provide accurate data because of their preliminary (unofficial) character and because some enterprises occur in more than one
group (as, for example, in the case of companies sold to new investors during the bankruptcy or liquidation process).
84 See Ministry of the State Treasury (2001), Dynamika Przekszta³ceñ W³asnoœciowych No. 47 (data as of 31 December, 2000).
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VII (only 5 firms) and NIF X (12 firms). The remaining funds
all sold 17–23 firms. There was no very visible differentia-
tion between the NIFs (excepting the three mentioned
above); however, we can mention NIF III as the leader in the
area of divestiture.
Of the 278 NIF companies transferred to date, 91 were
sold in 1999 and 2000. On the whole, therefore, we have not
observed a significant acceleration in this area. The excep-
tions are NIFs I, V, and XIII, which significantly accelerated
the pace of divestiture. Of the 22 total companies sold by
NIF I, for instance, 13 were sold in 1999. Interestingly, this
Fund was previously referred to as a restructuring-focused
one, whose declared strategic priority was increasing the
value of its companies through long-term restructuring. The
acceleration of divestiture by this fund, after considerable
restructuring efforts in the past, may be seen as confirmation
of the opinion that the transfer of the companies to new
owners was a better solution than further restructuring by
the NIFs, both for the companies and for the funds. The
solutions proposed earlier by some funds (e.g., organization-
al and capital consolidation) have proved to be a poor sub-
stitute for sale to outside strategic investors.
Table 5.4 shows that all categories of investors partici-
pating in other types of privatization in Poland are repre-
sented among the new owners of the NIF companies. The
most numerous new owners are domestic strategic
investors (large domestic companies), who became share-
holders in over 134 companies. In over 10 cases, domestic
investors took over the companies in bankruptcy or liquida-
tion processes. In a few cases shares in the firms with
domestic strategic investors were also quoted on the stock
exchange or sold to private individuals. The next most
numerous category of new owners consists of foreign
investors, who have taken over 57 firms. In three cases,
their acquisition occurred via the transfer of assets of liqui-
dated companies. In a few cases in the "foreign" group, the
new investors also included domestic owners or dispersed
shareholding on the stock exchange. Individual private own-
ers took over 48 firms. In a few cases, this occurred during
bankruptcy or liquidation procedures.
Employees became shareholders in 14 NIF companies.
Given the fact that investors from this group are generally
unable to provide the capital support necessary to these
weak companies, the fact that the participation of employ-
ee-owned companies in the secondary privatization process
has been so limited should be seen as fortunate.
Twenty-five companies were publicly quoted (on the
stock exchange and the over-the-counter market). Among
these publicly traded companies, 16 companies also have
leading shareholders. The low number of companies taking
part in this "beauty contest" may be seen as a quality mea-
sure of the condition of NIF firms. Only good enterprises
are brought to the stock exchange, and the fact that only a
little over 5% of NIF companies have made it into public
trading does not attest to the strength of the NIFs' restruc-
turing programs.
It seems likely that the character of the secondary own-
ership changes in the NIF companies provides some
promise for the development of their future potential. The
structure of ownership emerging in these companies is dif-
ferent from the structure that had been created in the pool
of firms privatized by other methods in Poland, since in most
cases new strategic investors, who can be future agents of
changes, have appeared.
To conclude this section, we turn our attention to a
more detailed examination of the ownership structure of
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Table 5.3. Ownership changes of NIF firms (number of cases as of 31 December, 2000) 
NIF Symbol Firms with new owners (total) Firms sold in 1999 and 2000
1 22 13
2 18 5
3 23 7
4 17 6
5 19 12
6 19 1
7 5 3
8 19 8
9 21 4
10 12 3
11 25 3
12 18 5
13 21 11
14 20 5
15 19 5
Total 278 91
Source: own calculation on the basis of the Ministry of the State Treasury, April 2001, Dynamika Przekszta³ceñ W³asnoœciowych, No. 47
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CASE Reports N
o. 48 Table 5.4. New owners of the NIF firms (leading shareholdersa, number of cases, 31 December, 1999)
NIF Number of
companies
Domestic
corporate
investors**
Foreign
investors**
Private**
individuals
Employees The stock
exchange*
OTC market* Bankruptcy
and liquidation
1 35 10 2 4 1 2 3 5
2 34 8 2 4 2 1 1 5
3 34 13 3 3 2 2 - 6
4 35 11 3 1 2 - - 2
5 35 11 2 3 3 - - 1
6 35 5 6 6 - - - 3
7 34 2 1 1 1 - - 5
8 34 10 5 4 - - - 7
9 34 8 8 2 1 - 2 4
10 33 5 3 2 - 1 1 2
11 33 12 6 1 - 4 2 3
12 33 13 6 1 - 4 2 3
13 34 11 4 5 - 1 - 4
14 34 8 4 5 - 3 - 1
15 35 7 6 5 1 - - 2
Total 512 134 57 48 14 15 52
Source: own calculation based on the Ministry of the State Treasury, Dynamika Przekszta³ceñ W³asnoœciowych, various issues (1996–2000).
a/ The companies have been classified here to each category, taking into account leading owners, possessing the majority shares in the company, what makes the difference between these data and the official
data from the Ministry, accounting for the appearance of new investor, independent from his share.
* – Ownership structure is dominated by dispersed shareholders.
**–29 enterprises started bankruptcy procedures after secondary ownership changes with the domestic and foreign investors and individual private entrepreneurs.
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the NIF portfolio companies, using the results of investiga-
tions of our research partners from this project85. Accord-
ing to these data, the concentration in the companies began
to increase, more slowly than in the funds, but remarkably.
By the year 2000, the largest shareholders were in near-
absolute control in about one third of the companies. This is
illustrated in table 5.5.
The position of National Investment Funds and the
State Treasury in the portfolio companies has rapidly
evolved in the post-privatization period. Table 5.6 sum-
marizes this evolution. As the quoted authors report, the
state has clearly withdrawn from active ownership and
participation in the affairs of these companies. In 99 com-
panies, the state has reduced its holding to zero86, while
its average share in the remaining companies has fallen to
about 20%. In 239 firms, the NIFs have completely dis-
posed of their shares and left them to the new owners.
Interestingly, the average share of lead NIFs in their port-
folio companies has slightly increased and stabilized at
about 36%. A small number of companies have a second
NIF as large shareholders (over 15%).
Whereas in the early days of the Polish schemes, only
NIFs and the state were the main players involved, other
dominant ownership groups entered the process gradually,
and many of them have now gained dominant positions in
the companies, as shown in table 5.6. These numbers go a
long way to meeting the initial objectives of the program and
are in sharp contrast with the overall negative assessment of
the NIF scheme.
With respect to the concentration of ownership stakes,
it is striking that, on the average, most strategic investors
have gained absolute control (more than 50%) of the firms'
equity. Financial institutions and other NIFs have, on aver-
age, about 33–35% of shares. The employees, who were
given special privileges in the Polish mass privatization, have
acquired control of only a small number of companies.
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Table 5.5. The average share of the largest shareholder in NIF portfolio companies
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean 33.94 36.63 41.25 46.25 48.28
Standard deviation 5.29 10.03 15.67 20.38 22.76
Median 33 33 33 33 33
Number of firms 512 512 512 512 512
Source: Grosfeld, Hashi (2001), op. cit. 
Table 5.6. Changes in the equity holdings of the State and of NIFs
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean state
shareholdings
100 54.07
(33.07)
25.35
(4.88)
23.62
(5.15)
22.40
(6.29)
21.82
(7.04)
21.50
(7.01)
Number of firms with
100% state equity
512 170 0 0 0 0 0
Number of firms with 0%
state equity
0 0 0 0 4 60 99
Number of firms with 0%
NIF equity
512 170 7 58 143 206 239
Mean shareholding of the
lead NIF*
33.00
(0.02)
33.00
(0.02)
32.94
(3.77)
33.89
(5.88)
34.93
(9.03)
35.50
(10.43)
35.78
(10.88)
Number of firms with a
second NIF as shareholder
0 0 3 11 18 18 15
Mean shareholdings of the
second NIF*
- - 17.47
(2.50)
20.19
(11.58)
22.02
(21.71)
23.81
(25.35)
19.62
(22.20)
Source: Grosfeld, Hashi (2001), op. cit.  
* The mean value is calculated only for the companies, which still have NIFs among their shareholders. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
85See Grosfeld, Hashi (2001), pp. 19–21.
86 According to the Ministry, in 89 companies at the end of 2000. 
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6.1. An Overview of the Entire NIF
Group in Comparison with Other Groups
of Companies 
The group of enterprises included in the NIF program
made up approximately 6% of the entire pool of state-
owned enterprises and represented about 10% of state-
owned assets in 1995. The net assets of 509 of the 512 NIF
companies were valued at 10.9 billion PLN (book value) at
the end of 1995. The current value of their actual assets is
much lower. In December 2000, the market value of shares
belonging to all NIF companies was assessed by the State
Treasury Ministry at 1.8 billion PLN87. 
On the average, NIF companies are of medium size
(200–1000 employees), and operate chiefly in the manufac-
turing or construction sectors. The manufacturing compa-
nies are dominated by machinery and equipment, foods and
beverages, and the chemical, construction materials, metal-
lurgy and garment industries. The most attractive enterpris-
es (such as telecommunication, energy, infrastructure etc.)
were not included in this group. Between June 1991, when
the first group of enterprises was chosen for the program,
and 1995, when the program finally started, many enter-
prises with good performance left the program, choosing
the indirect (or "capital") privatization path. The economic
and financial performance of the remaining companies has
deteriorated because of the delay of the program and the
lack of restructuring activities during the waiting phase. This
resulted in a very sharp decline of all economic and financial
indicators of the whole NIF sector. Other systemic reasons
that were discussed in previous sections seem to have
strengthened this tendency. 
In this section, concerning the financial situation of the
companies, we present selected economic and financial
indicators for the entire group of NIF portfolio companies
from 1991 to 1999, in comparison with other groups of Pol-
ish firms, categorized by the character of their ownership,
as follows:
1. Firms privatized by commercial methods such as
trade sales and initial public offerings, referred to in Poland
as indirect privatization; this group is divided into two sub-
groups:
– firms with foreign investors and
– firms with domestic investors.
2. Firms privatized by methods referred to in Poland as
direct privatization (mostly employee-owned companies).
3. State-owned enterprises undergoing privatization,
including:
– firms undergoing direct privatization and
– joint-stock companies wholly owned by the State
Treasury88 (which we will refer to as "State Treasury com-
panies").
The evolution of the profitability of the 512 enterprises
in the NIF Program gives little grounds for optimism (table
6.1). In 1991, the companies designated for participation in
the NIF Program had positive profitability indicators which
placed them near the average for the entire group of cur-
rently and formerly state-owned enterprises presented in
the table. As we have mentioned above, in the years prior
to the NIF program's takeoff, deep changes in the enter-
prises that had been designated for privatization in the pro-
gram were stopped and their ability to generate profits
reduced. At the end of 1994, the introduction of this Polish
version of mass privatization was already late and continued
to be delayed, and the firms which remained in the pool of
enterprises designated for NIF privatization tended to be
among the weakest in the economy (better firms had left
the program after their patience had been exhausted). In
1995, profitability fell rapidly, and the NIF group became
unprofitable. Their performance continued to deteriorate in
each subsequent year (with the exception of 1997).
In 1999 this group of Polish enterprises had the worst
profitability of those presented in table 6.1. The best results
were achieved by enterprises privatized by indirect meth-
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87 See Ministry of the State Treasury (2001). 
88 So-called commercialized enterprises.
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ods, and in this group the leaders were companies with for-
eign capital. Their relatively high gross profitability and its
stabilization in the period 1995–1999 confirm numerous
previous observations that this group of companies has the
best economic performance.
The deterioration of the macroeconomic situation in
1999 led to a decrease of gross profitability in all groups of
enterprises (with the exception of the foreign-owned ones),
but only the state-owned companies and NIF companies
had negative gross profitability.
Net profitability started to decrease for the NIF compa-
nies in 1995 and never recovered (see table 6.2). Much bet-
ter results were achieved in 1999 by other groups of priva-
tized enterprises, and even by State Treasury companies. It
is clear that the capital and/or strategies of other investors
were more effective in generating improvements in compa-
nies than were the NIFs.
If we narrow our focus to the group of firms which gen-
erated profits (Table 6.3), we see that a greater percentage
of the NIF companies in this group is profitable than in the
case of the state enterprises undergoing privatization. The
highest percentage of profitable firms is in the group of firms
privatized directly91.
Although the group of companies with foreign investors
has the highest profitability as a whole, we see from Table
6.3 that the percentage of profitable foreign-owned firms
has gradually declined. We believe that this is connected,
first, with the practice of transfer pricing, used very often by
multinational companies, and second, with the strong differ-
entiation of the "foreign" group. The latter is made up on the
one hand of enterprises in very good financial situations and,
on the other, of companies with weak financial indicators,
undergoing expensive restructuring. The results of other
research show that companies with foreign investors priva-
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Table 6.1. Gross profitability89 of NIF companies and other groups of Polish companies (1991–1999)
Group of companies 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Privatized total 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03
Indirect privatization 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06
Domestic investors 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.06
Foreign investors 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Direct privatization 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02
State-owned 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02
State Treasury
Companies
0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 >0 -0.01
NIF 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 <0 -0.018 -0.045
Source: own calculation on the basis of: Report of the Ministry of the State Treasury on Privatization (1999), database of the Ministry of the State Trea-
sury, Monitor Polski B (1995–2000).
Table 6.2. Net profitability90 of NIF companies and other groups of Polish companies (1991–1999)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Privatized total 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Indirect privatization 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Domestic investors 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03
Foreign investors 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Direct privatization 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
State-owned -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.02 >0 0.01 -0.04 -0.03
State Treasury
Companies
-0.04 -0.04 <0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
NIF 0.01 >0 -0.01 0.02 -0.030 -0.036 -0.016 -0.028 -0.051
Source: own calculation on the basis of: Report of the Ministry of the State Treasury (1999), database of the Ministry of the State Treasury, Monitor Pol-
ski B (1995–2000).
89 Gross profitability equals gross profit divided by sales revenues.
90 Net profitability equals net profit divided by sales revenues.
91 We can explain this partially (for the years immediately after privatization) by the selection bias. This group of companies had a relatively good
starting point because the Ministry of Ownership Transformation (now the Ministry of the State Treasury) accepted only firms in relatively good stand-
ing for this method of privatization. Moreover, observations over the course of the last decade show that "insiders" have learned their owners' role
quite effectively and (in general) achieve positive effects, despite the lack of external sources of capital and rather conservative strategies. See also
Kozarzewski and Woodward (2001).
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tized relatively early have the best achievements in restruc-
turing thanks to the impact of the strategies and capital of
the owners92. But the "latecomers" in this group may be
struggling with problems similar to those experienced by
other kinds of less successful investors, or (alternatively)
their positive influence may still be invisible in the short
period of time which has elapsed since they acquired the
NIF portfolio companies.
In contrast, the firms from the NIF group had both neg-
ative profitability on the average and a low share of prof-
itable firms (this share deteriorated sharply in 1999, from
63% in the previous year to 44%). The deep difference
between NIF companies and foreign-owned companies
appeared in 1999. The percentage of profitable foreign-
owned companies stabilized, but that of NIF firms fell rapid-
ly. Generally, 1999 was a "moment of truth" of sorts after
the difficult year 1998. The percentage of profitable priva-
tized enterprises (excepting the NIF companies) was stable
and much higher than in the weaker state-owned sector.
Financial liquidity, as measured by the current ratio93
(see table 6.4), began to decline in all groups of Polish enter-
prises except NIF companies in 1995. Relatively high liquid-
ity (near world standards) was found in companies priva-
tized by "indirect" methods94, and the lowest in state-
owned enterprises. The NIF companies also had relatively
high liquidity, taking second place (after foreign-owned
companies) in 1999. Efficient management of current assets
is probably the greatest strength of NIF control. 
The liabilities-to-assets ratio provides both an indication
of the role of external capital in financing a company and the
ability of an enterprise to service its debt out of current rev-
enues. By world standards, this ratio should be between
0.57 and 0.67. If we look at the values in table 6.5, we see
the best values in firms privatized directly. State-owned
firms, including State Treasury companies, achieved results
which were not far from international standards, probably
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Table 6.3. Number of firms with net profits (%)
Total 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Privatized total 100 79 73 80 79 79 80 73 64
Excluding NIF 100 72 74 80 82 83 80 74 n.n.
Indirect privatization 100 78 71 74 80 84 79 69 63
Domestic investors 100 76 69 77 81 88 83 72 62
Foreign investors 100 82 73 70 76 78 71 65 65
Direct privatization 100 74 77 83 85 86 83 77 74
State-owned enterprises 100 66 66 75 79 78 68 57 45
State Treasury
Companies
100 66 66 71 75 75 60 51 39
NIF 100 73 63 73 62 53 68 63 44
Source: own calculation on the basis of: Report of the Ministry of the State Treasury (1999), database of the Ministry of the State Treasury, Monitor Pol-
ski B (1995-2000).
Table 6.4. Current ratio
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Privatized total 1.32 1.18 1.66 1.64 1.64 1.48 1.44 1.40 1.29
Indirect privatization 1.40 1.46 2.01 2.09 1.88 1.53 1.50 1.51 1.42
Domestic investors 1.41 1.51 2.20 2.34 2.07 1.49 1.45 1.51 1.38
Foreign investors 1.37 1.34 1.71 1.71 1.61 1.60 1.58 1.52 1.49
Direct privatization 1.28 1.11 1.87 1.88 1.65 1.59 1.43 1.31 1.24
State-owned 1.03 0.86 1.15 1.32 1.22 1.06 0.97 0.82 0.78
State Treasury
Companies
1.04 0.88 1.37 1.66 1.58 1.32 1.20 1.11 1.07
NIF 1.43 1.29 1.70 1.86 1.86 1.86 2.00 1.72 1.43
Source: own calculation on the basis of: Report of the Ministry of the State Treasury (1999), database of the Ministry of the State Treasury, Monitor Pol-
ski B (1995–2000).
92 See Kamiñski (1999).
93 The current ratio equals current assets divided by short-term liabilities. 
94 We can assume that the lower current ratios of the firms with the foreign owners are due to changes in marketing practices, which is one of the
main directions of restructuring in that group of enterprises. This interpretation is supported by the stabilization of the quick ratio (i.e., current assets
minus inventory, divided by short-term liabilities). This was also observed in other groups of firms, but to a lesser extent.
36
B. B³aszczyk, M. Górzyñski, T. Kamiñski, B. Paczóski 
for the same reason as in direct privatization group: lack of
external sources of the capital. Firms privatized by "indirect"
methods had an unusually low use of external sources of
capital. The NIF companies, too, had low liabilities-to-assets
ratios. Use of external sources of financing has become
increasingly important for them, but they are still not lever-
aging themselves to the extent that they should in order to
meet their restructuring and current needs.
The entire financial analysis of NIF companies in com-
parison with other Polish companies leads us to the conclu-
sion that control by the funds has not caused an improve-
ment in the performance of the portfolio companies which
are in weak condition. 
6.2. The Performance of NIF Companies
Sold to New Owners
In this section we present the financial situation of NIF
companies that have undergone secondary ownership
changes (i.e., have been sold to new owners). We divided
the NIF companies into groups by the type of new owners
emerging as a result of secondary ownership changes: 
– domestic and foreign strategic investors, 
– private individuals, 
– employees, 
– dispersed ownership (companies quoted on the stock
exchange), and 
– those companies in which (a) National Investment
Fund(s) continues to be the main owner. 
We analyzed the financial reports from almost all enter-
prises taking part in the program using a database prepared
for the needs of this research project. We have gathered
complete financial information for the years 1996–1999 for
each of 429 of the 438 NIF portfolio companies which were
not undergoing bankruptcy and liquidation procedures or
already liquidated. Our intention was to learn whether the
restructuring of the enterprises by the NIFs and the new
owners has brought any effects on financial performance
and which group of owners achieved the best financial
results. 
We additionally divided the firms that had undergone
secondary ownership changes into groups by the date of
their sale, in order to take into account the length of the
period of influence of the new owners on the enterprises. In
analyzing the economic indicators and financial ratios we
also took into account the number of the firms that have
undergone bankruptcy or liquidation as a measure of the
failures of different types of owners. Moreover, in analyzing
these data, we have to take into account the following con-
siderations. First, the sample contains companies from most
of the industries represented in the Polish economy, ranging
in size from the very small, with minimal assets, to the large,
with sales in the hundreds of millions of PLN. The high dif-
ferentiation in the financial standing of the companies is evi-
denced by the large gap between the average sales figure
when weighted by assets and the arithmetic average for
sales, as well as by the median and the standard deviation for
the various groups of companies (see table 6.12). It is
important to remember that this lack of uniformity in the
groups of companies has an effect on the results of our
microeconomic analysis. 
The relatively short amount of time following the acquisi-
tion of the NIF portfolio companies by investors (less than two
years on the average) is also significant. Because of this, it is
impossible to carry out a meaningful comparative analysis of the
financial standing of the companies in the period in which they
were held by the NIFs and the period following acquisition.
Such a short period is not sufficient to allow for the appearance
of discernible financial improvements resulting from the invest-
ments and restructuring activity undertaken by the investor,
and to eliminate the effects of decisions made by the previous
owner. Only the addition of the companies' performance data
for the years 2001–2001 to the analysis would suffice to make
the differentiation of the financial effects of the two ownership
periods feasible. Finally, the results of the analysis were affect-
ed by the macroeconomic downturn (decreasing rates of
growth) in the Polish economy in 1998–1999.
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Table 6.5. Liabilities-to-assets ratio
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Privatized total 0.35 0.41 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.53
Indirect privatization 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.35 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.50
Domestic investors 0.32 0.31 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.49
Foreign investors 0.30 0.34 0.40 0.48 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.53
Direct privatization 0.43 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.62
State-owned 0.35 0.46 0.53 0.54 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.57
State Treasury
Companies
0.40 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.53
NIF 0.30 0.34 0.40 0.48 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.40
Source: own calculation on the basis of: Report of the Ministry of the State Treasury (1999), data base of the Ministry of the State Treasury, Monitor
Polski B (1995–2000).
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The research carried out in the first stage of this project
showed an economic decline in all of the groups of NIF
portfolio companies (see tables 6.6–6.9). Detailed analysis
of the economic performance of the NIF companies
(grouped by the type of investor and the year of sale to that
investor) showed no significant relationship between the
change in the financial performance of the companies fol-
lowing their acquisition and the type of investor acquiring
them. (The results of this research are not presented here
but are available upon request.) The following performance
indicators were used in that analysis:
– gross sales profitability (gross profit / sales revenue),
– net sales profitability (net profit / sales revenue),
– return on assets (net profit / assets),
– return on equity (net profit / equity capital),
– liquidity – current ratio (current assets / short-term
liabilities), and
– liquidity – quick ratio (current assets minus inventory
/ short-term liabilities).
The reliability of profitability indicators is unfortunately
very limited in transition countries. Companies very often
use various methods to conceal their true profits, and in
doing so make it difficult or impossible to base a reliable
assessment on profitability indicators. This is especially visi-
ble in the case of foreign-owned companies, which often
use transfer pricing to generate losses. Additionally, one-off
high net profits in companies that have experienced financial
distress often result from the result of debt restructuring
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Table 6.6. Gross and net profitability
Gross profitability Net profitabilityLeading Shareholder Total N
1995 1999 1995 1999
Domestic corporate investors Average 106 105 -0.060 -0.032 -0.073 -0.036
Median 106 105 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000
Foreign investors Average 49 48 0.005 -0.093 -0.018 -0.098
Median 49 48 0.020 -0.020 0.007 -0.020
Domestic individuals Average 30 29 -0.013 -0.011 -0.026 -0.020
Median 30 29 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
Employees Average 13 13 -0.112 -0.137 -0.120 -0.138
Median 13 13 -0.091 -0.022 -0.091 -0.022
Stock exchange Average 28 28 0.049 -0.053 0.019 -0.023
Median 28 28 0.048 0.001 0.028 0.000
NIF companies Average 212 206 0.010 -0.038 -0.012 -0.046
Median 212 206 0.027 0.000 0.010 0.000
Total Average 438 429 -0.010 -0.045 -0.030 -0.049
Median 438 429 0.018 0.000 0.006 0.000
Source: own calculations.
Table 6.7. Net ROA and ROE
Net return on assets Return on equityLeading Shareholder Total N
1995 1999 1995 1999
Domestic corporate investors Average 106 105 -0.057 -0.045 -0.042 -0.121
Median 106 105 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000
Foreign investors Average 49 48 0.016 -0.067 -0.009 -0.143
Median 49 48 0.009 -0.045 0.013 0.000
Domestic individuals Average 30 29 -0.047 -0.051 -0.145 -0.122
Median 30 29 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003
Employees Average 13 13 -0.114 -0.196 -0.322 -0.454
Median 13 13 -0.083 -0.045 -0.212 -0.063
Stock exchange Average 28 28 0.041 -0.011 0.047 -0.034
Median 28 28 0.043 0.000 0.067 0.000
NIF companies Average 212 206 0.005 -0.050 0.005 -0.098
Median 212 206 0.012 0.000 0.017 0.000
Total Average 438 429 -0.014 -0.053 -0.026 -0.089
Median 438 429 0.008 0.000 0.013 0.000
Source: own calculations.
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agreements with their creditors and therefore fail to reflect
their real financial situation. Finally, return on equity in com-
panies with negative equity (there are a large number of
such companies among those sold to domestic individuals
and employees) is entirely devoid of explanatory value.
The decline in the economic condition of NIF portfolio
companies is demonstrated by the large percentage of these
companies which have gone into bankruptcy or liquidation
(see table 6.10). More than 15% of the companies have
been liquidated or gone bankrupt, and one third of these
companies had been sold earlier to various types of
investors (especially domestic individuals). 
In a group of companies as large and diversified as the
NIF portfolio companies, given the methodological prob-
lems described above, the best measure of performance
appears to be sales. The ratio of sales in 1999 to sales in
1995 allows us to draw conclusions concerning the change
in their financial and market situation during that period. We
studied these changes in the second phase of the project.
Companies sold to external investors had two different
owners during the period under analysis. As mentioned
above, however, it is impossible to completely analytically
separate the sub-periods in which they belonged to those dif-
ferent owners in order to distinguish between the economic
performance effects of those owners (making the appropriate
corrections for changes in market conditions, demand, etc.).
For this reason, we analyze the performance of the portfolio
companies for the entire 1995–1999 period, without break-
ing that period down into sub-periods. We do, however,
break the companies down into groups with respect to the
type of investor and the year of sale of the firm.
Table 6.11 shows the sum of sales for the aforemen-
tioned groups of NIF portfolio companies. Table 6.12 shows
the average value of sales weighted by assets, the arithmetic
average value of sales, the median value of sales and the
standard deviation of sales. All values are expressed in con-
stant 1995 prices.
We observe the worst situation in companies sold to
domestic individuals and employees. The drastic drop in
sales (ranging from 30 to 60% for the whole period) for
these groups shows that they experienced no positive
effects of privatization during that period (see tables 6.11
and 6.12). This result is supported, moreover, by the less
reliable profitability indicators discussed above, as well as by
the fact that the highest percentage of companies which
have entered bankruptcy or liquidation is found in the group
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Table 6.8. Current and quick ratios
Current ratio Quick ratioLeading Shareholder Total N
1995 1999 1995 1999
Domestic corporate investors Average 106 105 1.601 1.087 0.871 0.737
Median 106 105 1.406 1.030 0.654 0.571
Foreign investors Average 49 48 1.923 1.365 0.986 0.998
Median 49 48 1.762 1.069 0.682 0.614
Domestic individuals Average 30 29 1.448 1.056 0.626 0.618
Median 30 29 1.446 0.781 0.555 0.428
Employees Average 13 13 0.697 0.613 0.381 0.385
Median 13 13 0.698 0.630 0.363 0.335
Stock exchange Average 28 28 2.219 2.374 1.079 1.363
Median 28 28 1.952 2.008 0.804 1.072
NIF companies Average 212 206 2.053 1.592 1.074 1.060
Median 212 206 1.765 1.390 0.804 0.811
Total Average 438 429 1.858 1.428 0.964 0.948
Median 438 429 1.560 1.193 0.733 0.682
Source: own calculations.
Table 6.9. Number of firms with positive net profit (%)
Leading Shareholder Total N 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Domestic corporate investors 106 105 48% 52% 65% 66% 48%
Foreign investors 49 48 71% 48% 54% 54% 33%
Domestic individuals 30 29 52% 41% 52% 38% 52%
Employees 13 13 23% 0% 31% 38% 31%
Stock exchange 28 28 89% 79% 93% 79% 43%
NIF companies 212 206 70% 57% 75% 66% 44%
Average 438 429 63% 53% 68% 63% 44%
Source: own calculations.
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of companies sold to domestic individuals (of 40 such com-
panies, 10 – or 25% – entered bankruptcy or liquidation).
While the number of active, profitable firms in both
these groups did not change significantly in the years
1995–1999 (and in companies purchased by employees
actually rose slightly), we must remember that this prof-
itability is often generated artificially as a result of debt
reduction agreements with creditors. It is important to note
that in the years 1998–1999 a large number of these com-
panies had negative equity.
Domestic individuals and employees most often
acquired small companies (see table 6.12), which were
often in poor financial standing at the time of purchase.
They often acquired those companies for low (or even sym-
bolic) prices. As we noted above, regardless of how long
these purchasers have been involved in the companies, they
have proved unable to provide the restructuring and
improvements those companies need (due, perhaps, to lack
of capital and inexperience). As a result, these companies
have drifted into declining performance. It is clear that pur-
CASE Reports No. 48
Table 6.10. Bankruptcy and liquidation
Leading Shareholder Total 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Domestic corporate investors 15 0 0 0 2 2 11
Foreign investors 4 0 0 0 2 2 0
Domestic individuals 10 0 0 0 4 3 3
Employees 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stock exchange 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NIF companies 50 1 14 11 12 6 6
Total 79 1 14 11 20 13 20
Source: own calculations.
Table 6.11. Revenues from sales in 1995 prices (in millions of PLN)
Leading Shareholder Acquired Total N 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 99/'95
Domestic corporate investors 1996 8 8 279.3 341.2 308.4 270.5 254.7 0.912
1997 26 26 885.2 909.4 995.4 1 064.9 849.2 0.959
1998 43 42 1 077.9 1 059.3 1 003.1 979.6 991.0 0.919
1999 29 29 1 374.0 1 347.5 1 363.6 1 257.7 1 087.7 0.792
Total 106 105 3 616.4 3,661.1 3,670.6 3,572.6 3,182.6 0.880
Foreign investors 1996 6 6 644.6 633.4 644.8 647.6 599.8 0.930
1997 16 16 981.3 1 083.9 933.8 1 019.1 935.2 0.953
1998 19 18 1 617.7 1 483.7 1 403.7 1 216.9 1 144.5 0.708
1999 8 8 918.7 819.3 809.2 715.9 694.3 0.756
Total 49 48 4 162.3 4,020.4 3,791.5 3,599.5 3,373.8 0.811
Domestic individuals 1996 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
1997 3 3 37.6 29.8 27.2 18.6 17.1 0.454
1998 13 13 359.2 291.8 298.2 248.9 235.7 0.656
1999 14 13 515.7 481.5 454.1 356.6 309.0 0.599
Total 30 29 912.5 803.1 779.5 624.2 561.9 0.616
Employees 1996 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
1997 2 2 64.7 45.6 43.6 37.1 33.8 0.522
1998 5 5 136.7 127.8 99.6 78.5 66.9 0.489
1999 6 6 138.0 156.7 144.5 97.3 56.0 0.406
Total 13 13 339.4 330.1 287.8 212.8 156.6 0.462
Stock exchange 1996 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
1997 15 15 879.5 813.0 801.9 733.1 649.8 0.739
1998 11 11 376.4 356.0 346.8 309.3 270.7 0.719
1999 2 2 66.0 64.2 89.4 81.2 99.0 1.499
Total 28 28 1,321.9 1,233.2 1,225.4 1,123.6 1,019.5 0.771
NIF companies Total 212 206 9,506.0 9,229.5 9,100.1 7,811.2 7,026.7 0.739
Total Total 438 429 19,859 19,274 18,855 16,944 15,321 0.772
Source: own calculations.
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Table 6.12. Average sales revenues in 1995 prices (weighted by assets)
Leading Shareholder Acquired Total N 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 99/'95
Domestic corporate investors 1996 8 8 46.4 61.8 56.0 57.3 54.2 1.168
1997 26 26 46.1 47.5 51.3 55.7 37.2 0.805
1998 43 42 40.3 39.3 35.2 34.0 35.5 0.881
1999 29 29 128.4 118.5 117.9 106.3 75.4 0.587
w.a. 106 105 68.9 67.8 67.8 63.8 49.7 0.721
a.a. 106 105 34.1 34.5 34.6 33.7 30.0 0.880
Median 106 105 26.1 26.6 26.9 24.5 23.1 0.887
St.dev. 106 105 41.8 40.2 38.8 40.1 29.2 0.697
Foreign investors 1996 6 6 112.8 112.5 112.7 113.2 104.9 0.930
1997 16 16 88.2 93.1 87.9 99.8 95.0 1.077
1998 19 18 216.0 185.1 189.6 156.1 155.5 0.720
1999 8 8 334.8 256.6 254.7 196.2 183.1 0.547
w.a. 49 48 188.1 160.1 157.0 139.7 131.0 0.696
a.a. 49 48 84.9 82.0 77.4 73.5 68.9 0.811
Median 49 48 63.1 58.2 51.8 53.9 43.7 0.692
St.dev. 49 48 100.4 83.2 81.9 67.0 67.3 0.670
Domestic individuals 1996 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
1997 3 3 13.1 9.9 8.8 3.1 3.4 0.259
1998 13 13 42.2 28.2 30.3 28.7 34.0 0.805
1999 14 13 68.2 62.8 61.3 51.2 42.3 0.620
w.a. 30 29 57.4 50.2 50.0 42.9 38.5 0.671
a.a. 30 29 30.4 26.8 26.0 20.8 18.7 0.616
Median 30 29 19.6 17.7 17.7 12.5 11.6 0.589
St.dev. 30 29 28.5 23.4 23.0 20.6 19.1 0.672
Employees 1996 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
1997 2 2 40.8 26.9 24.4 21.0 19.4 0.475
1998 5 5 35.6 34.2 28.8 25.6 25.5 0.714
1999 6 6 23.6 25.7 23.3 15.0 8.8 0.373
w.a. 13 13 30.2 29.4 25.7 20.2 17.0 0.562
a.a. 13 13 26.1 25.4 22.1 16.4 12.0 0.462
Median 13 13 21.5 21.9 21.1 14.6 9.6 0.445
St.dev. 13 13 15.1 11.2 10.5 8.3 8.5 0.559
Stock exchange 1996 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
1997 15 15 103.2 88.3 91.1 86.7 74.7 0.724
1998 11 11 49.4 42.8 39.2 34.2 30.5 0.618
1999 2 2 34.8 33.2 39.4 41.9 53.8 1.547
w.a. 28 28 83.7 72.9 74.0 69.9 62.0 0.741
a.a. 28 28 52.9 49.3 49.0 44.9 40.8 0.771
Median 28 28 36.7 38.0 38.2 36.5 31.9 0.869
St.dev. 28 28 40.9 33.6 33.7 31.1 28.3 0.694
NIF companies w.a. 212 208 113.7 104.8 103.0 89.6 87.6 0.771
a.a. 212 208 44.1 42.9 42.4 36.4 32.8 0.745
Median 212 206 30.9 30.6 28.0 23.8 20.4 0.659
St.dev. 212 206 66.1 54.8 53.8 42.6 40.7 0.615
Total w.a. 438 429 113.7 103.4 103.6 93.3 87.7 0.771
a.a. 438 429 45.4 44.1 43.1 38.8 35.1 0.772
Median 438 429 30.3 30.5 29.1 25.3 22.4 0.739
St.dev. 438 429 63.6 54.1 52.8 45.0 41.8 0.657
w.a. - weighted average; a.a. - arithmetic average
Source: own calculations.
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chase by outside investors does not necessarily lead to
improvements in small, weak NIF portfolio companies.
As we see in tables 6.11 and 6.12, a significant decline
was also experienced by companies which were not sold by
the NIFs (i.e., the largest block of shares still belongs to the
leading NIF) and by companies which were traded publicly
(with the exception of two companies which were only list-
ed in 1999). Although at first glance the status of these two
groups of companies appears to be different, it turns out
that from the point of view of ownership control they are in
similar situations. The largest block of shares in a typical
publicly traded company continues to be held by the com-
pany's leading NIF or is held by a large, dispersed group of
shareholders. Thus, these companies continue to lack a
strong outside investor who could bring them capital,
know-how, etc. One important difference lies in the fact
that the initial condition of publicly listed companies was
much better than that of those that remained in the NIF
portfolios. But, while the former group of companies were
often the flagships of the NIF Program, performance dete-
riorated for them just as rapidly as it did in the latter
group95.
We observe the smallest deterioration in 1995–1999
sales performance in the groups of companies sold to
domestic corporations and foreign investors in 1996 and
1997. In fact, for companies sold to domestic corporations
in 1996 and to foreign investors in 1997, the weighted aver-
age of sales rose. The groups in which these surprisingly
good indicators are found, are groups of companies which
were sold relatively early. Companies sold in 1998 (espe-
cially to foreign investors) had much worse results. The
worst figures are observed for companies sold latest – in
1999 (these figures are comparable with those for publicly
traded companies and those which continue to be owned
by the NIFs). These figures are, moreover, generally consis-
tent with the results of the analysis of the profitability indi-
cators discussed above. 
While the latter analysis does not confirm the positive
performance of companies sold in 1997–1998 to foreign
investors, we have already noted the reasons why the reli-
ability of profitability indicators is especially poor in the case
of foreign investors, who very frequently use transfer pric-
ing in order to artificially reduce their profits.
One could argue, on the other hand, that the NIFs' first
action (in 1996–1997) was to sell the best companies in
their portfolios to domestic corporations and foreign
investors, and that in 1998–1999 they were therefore left
with weaker firms. However, while this argument holds for
companies sold in 1996–1997 to domestic corporations and
foreign investors, it does not hold for companies sold to
other types of investors during those years and at later
dates. In particular, it does not hold for the "flagship" com-
panies introduced to public trading with very good financial
performance – as we have noted, that performance later
deteriorated significantly, regardless of the year in which a
given company was listed.
We seem, therefore, to have confirmed our hypothesis,
that quick, efficiently organized privatization and secondary
privatization help enterprises to maintain or improve their
economic and market standing. The NIF Program, which in
effect "privatized" the process of privatization of the portfo-
lio companies, was a success to the extent that it led to the
rapid sale of medium-sized and large companies to domes-
tic corporations and foreign investors, which helped those
companies to at least maintain their market position. How-
ever, the financial situation of small companies sold cheaply
to domestic individuals and employees, companies sold rel-
atively late (1998–1999), and companies listed on the stock
exchange is much worse and can be ascribed to the lack of
a strong investor over a relatively long period of time. Once
again we see that rapid privatization is better than no priva-
tization, and having a strong private owner is better than
state or public ownership or listing on the stock exchange.
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95 This was due, to some extent, to methodological factors. Publicly traded companies in which an outside investor acquired a majority block of
shares (> 50%) were not placed in the group of publicly traded companies, but rather in the groups of companies acquired by investors, regardless
of whether they continued to be publicly traded.
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Our research on the factors behind, and effects of, the
ownership evolution of the National Investment Funds
(NIFs) and their portfolio companies was concentrated in
four areas:
– The changes in the ownership structure of the funds
and their concentration;
– The management of the funds (with a focus on corpo-
rate governance and management costs);
– The strategies of the funds, especially their privatiza-
tion efforts; 
– The changes in the ownership structure of the portfo-
lio companies and the trends in their performance.
The analysis presented in the first part of this paper
showed significant shifts in the ownership of the funds in the
stage of secondary privatization and a strong tendency to
ownership concentration of shareholdings. The share of the
State Treasury and small investors decreased significantly, in
contrast to the increasing share of institutional domestic and
foreign investors and cross-holdings between the NIFs. 
At the beginning of the NIF Program, the State Treasury
(representing the owners of Certificates of Ownership –
COs) was the main shareholder of the funds and fully con-
trolled them. Its ownership share started to decrease when
the process of exchanging COs for NIF shares began. The
share of the State Treasury decreased significantly at the end
of 1998, when the validity of the COs expired. As of the
beginning of 1999, the state continued to hold only shares
corresponding to certificates not redeemed by the citizens
and shares reserved for remuneration of the management
firms. Since that time, the ownership share of the state in
the NIFs has continued to decrease and the Minister of the
State Treasury has started to play a passive role in the funds.
As a result, by the beginning of 2001 the state's share
amounted to 13.4%.
The second important point is the decreasing share of
small institutional and  individual investors who own less
than 5% of the shares in a single NIF and who at the begin-
ning of the program owned 85% of the NIFs' shares. After
the completion of the exchange process, at the end of 1998
these investors owned almost 50% of the shares of the
NIFs. By the beginning of 2001, the share of small and indi-
vidual investors had dropped to 41% – less than half of its
original level.
While the share of the State Treasury and small investors
in NIFs has been decreasing, the share of institutional and
large investors has been rising. The share of institutional
investors, starting at 0% in November 1995, jumped to 46%
by the end of 2000. Analyzing the shareholdings of large
investors, we have observed that foreign investors are the
chief group responsible for the rapid increase in the involve-
ment of large investors in the Program. In June 1998, foreign
investors had only 2.5% of the shares of NIFs, but by January
2001, they had more than 26% of the shares, which consti-
tuted 57.5% of the total shareholdings of large investors. At
the same time the shareholdings of Polish investors increased
much less significantly. In June 1998, Polish investors held
4.1% of the NIF shares, and in January 2001, they held only
13.5%. Analyzing the shareholding of large investors, we also
observe the increasing involvement of other NIFs. As of the
end of 2000, almost 6% of NIF shares were owned by other
NIFs. All the observed trends – the decreasing share of the
State Treasury and small investors, the increasing share of
institutional domestic and foreign investors and the growth of
cross-holding relations among the NIFs – reflect progressing
ownership concentration. 
Over a period of 2.5 years (from June 1998 to Decem-
ber 2000) the C1 index (that is, the share of the single
largest shareholder) increased from 5.41% to almost 24%,
and the C3 index (the share of the three largest sharehold-
ers) increased from almost 7% to 42%. Our analysis thus
demonstrates the impressive pace at which the ownership
concentration of the NIFs is progressing. As of the end of
2000, just four years after NIFs' quotation on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange and two years after the State Treasury lost
its majority stakes in the NIFs, all NIFs achieved a concen-
tration level96 and ownership structure ensuring full and sta-
ble control over the funds. As a result, opportunities for
new entries into the NIFs are practically limited to portfolio
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investments. Any investors interested in acting as large and
active players on the NIF share market will have to buy
blocks of shares from other large investors who are already
playing that role. 
The main institutional investors on the NIF share market
can be divided into two groups. The first group includes the
largest institutional investors, who are interested in control-
ling the funds. The second group includes the most active
portfolio investors. As of the end of 2000, the three most
active investors were domestic financial groups (two banks
and one insurance company) who had directly or indirectly
gained control over 11 funds. The remaining four funds are
controlled by foreign investors.
Analyzing the concentration process on the NIF market,
we hypothesize that the main incentive driving it consisted
in the profits that the funds' shareholders derived from
management contracts between the management firms
controlled by those shareholders and the funds themselves.
The very high management fees paid to the management
firms consumed a significant part of the funds' financial base,
reaching as much as 50% of the entire market value of their
assets during the years 1997–2000. Investors obtained the
lucrative management contracts by first achieving share-
holdings which gave them dominant position on the super-
visory boards of the NIFs and subsequently directing the
funds to sign such contracts. Additionally, the synergy effect
from managing more than one fund allowed the manage-
ment firms to maximize their profits.
In the second part of the paper, we focused our analysis
on the management system of the funds, with special atten-
tion to corporate governance problems and actual costs of
the services of management firms. 
We found that the main problem connected with the
management of the NIFs resulted from the very complicat-
ed corporate governance structure of the funds. The divi-
sion of tasks, rights and obligations among the three man-
agement organs (management boards, supervisory boards,
and contracted management firms) and the relations
between them and the State Treasury have been unclear
from the beginning. There was a confusing combination of
subordinate and superior roles of the management firms in
this system, but the main difficulties resulted from the
ambiguous position of supervisory boards, which acted both
as corporate management organs on the one hand and gov-
ernment representatives on the other. Additionally, the
members of the NIFs' supervisory boards often tried to
interfere in the day-to-day management of the funds. The
State Treasury, in turn, was very active in influencing all par-
ticipants in the early stages of the NIF Program (using both
direct and indirect means for exercising such influence).
All these facts created a very confusing situation, in
which the mutual relations among the three NIF manage-
ment organs and the State Treasury had to be clarified day
by day in practice, often by the use of political power. This
in turn caused many conflicts and sometimes real battles, as
well as disappointments all round. It is therefore not sur-
prising that in such a situation each party tended first of all
to secure its own benefits from participating in the pro-
gram. Since late 1998, the privatization of firms belonging to
NIFs began in earnest. As of January 1999, as already men-
tioned, the State Treasury no longer had majority power to
control the funds' activities. This resulted in an acceleration
of the privatization and consolidation process of the funds
and changed their ownership structure, as we noted above.
But the first three years after the funds' establishment were,
to a large extent, lost for efficient secondary privatization,
because mutual blocking mechanisms in the corporate gov-
ernance structure of the funds hindered any decisive activi-
ty on the part of the fund management.
A second very important factor bearing on the overall
effects of NIF privatization consists in the number and par-
tially contradictory definition of tasks assigned to the funds.
Including in these tasks both the economic and financial
restructuring of portfolio companies and the privatization
and raising of the value of the NIFs' assets made it difficult to
realize all these goals simultaneously, at least in the short or
medium term. There was political pressure from the State
Treasury as well as from the trade unions of portfolio com-
panies to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation of the companies.
Often, there was also resistance from the portfolio compa-
nies' unions and management against radical restructuring. In
effect, the restructuring activities of the funds, insofar as they
extended beyond changes in the management boards of the
portfolio companies, had a rather soft and defensive charac-
ter. Restructuring activities of the funds were sometimes
blocked by the State Treasury. The Ministry felt responsible
for the performance of the program, and was especially
interested in "restructuring before privatization." It therefore
tried to set limits on some of the activities of the fund man-
agers, which were directed toward quicker distribution of
shares in portfolio companies. Long lasting battles between
the funds and the State Treasury on the choice of "proper"
strategies were endemic in the early stage of the program,
when the majority of shares were in the hands of the state. 
Finally, it turned out that the NIF managers strongly pre-
ferred secondary privatization (i.e., sale to other investors)
as the main method of restructuring the portfolio compa-
nies. On the basis of our research, we suspect that other
kinds of restructuring were neither available in this concrete
systemic context nor desirable. The impossibility was due
to the huge needs of the portfolio companies and the lack
of financial means and industrial restructuring know-how
(the lack of "enterprise doctors") at the fund level. And it
was probably not desirable due to the doubtful quality of
the investment decisions which would likely be made by
players so strongly driven by political forces. 
One of the main research questions, to which we are at
this point only able to provide a partial answer, is the extent
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to which the construction of this privatization scheme influ-
enced the economic performance of the enterprises priva-
tized thereby. At this stage, it seems that the initial owner-
ship structure of the NIFs, the associated corporate gover-
nance regime, the financial situation of the funds and their
regulatory environment have not motivated fund manage-
ment to engage in restructuring activities in enterprises, but
have rather encouraged sales and liquidations. This tenden-
cy has been strengthened by the management incentive sys-
tem existing at the NIF level. At the same time, strong gov-
ernment influence has hindered faster privatization of the
NIF portfolio companies and the consolidation activities of
the funds. The internal inconsistency of the NIF system,
together with the unfavorable conditions on the capital mar-
ket, unfavorable tax regulations and the activist stance of the
State Treasury, narrowed the scope of possible activities of
the funds and might be among the main reasons that this
program has not lived up to expectations. 
Analyzing the costs of management firms services, we
found that their remuneration was from the beginning set at
a very high level, unjustified by the value of managed assets.
Additionally, it was clear that the fixed element of the total
fee (the annual flat cash fee) was too large relative to the
remuneration for financial performance (yearly and final),
potentially distorting the incentive system for fund man-
agers. The actual costs of management, moreover, far
exceeded all expectations. As of the end of 2000, the total
amount spent on management services in the NIFs exceed-
ed the huge sum of 756 million PLN, equaling 42.4% of the
entire capitalization of the funds. By the end of 2000, for
example, one NIF had a ratio of costs to capitalization of
91.3%; in contrast, the only fund in which this ratio did not
exceed 15% was the only NIF that was not run by a man-
agement firm. Moreover, the relative significance of the fees
for financial performance in the entire remuneration of the
fund managers was remarkably low. 
This shows that the use of contracted management
companies was very expensive business for the program97.
Moreover, management fees were not adjusted downward
to reflect the decline in actual costs to the management
firms as their portfolios decreased in size. Similarly, the con-
solidation of funds, which placed more than one fund under
the supervision of one management firm, did not influence
the amount of the fee98. Analyzing the ratio of management
costs to capitalization of the funds, we see clearly that the
management costs of the funds may soon consume the
entire value of their assets. The general conclusion is quite
obvious – unless there is an unusual growth in the price of
fund shares or a radical reduction in managers' fees, the
management costs will exceed the market value of the man-
aged property. In this situation it is very likely that the NIF
Program will be concluded sooner than planned (in 2005).
The next question that we tried to answer was whether
the NIF Program accelerated the privatization process in
Poland. In order to do this we compared the privatization
efficiency – i.e., the quantitative privatization results – of the
National Investment Funds (NIFs) and the Ministry of the
State Treasury. The "privatization efficiency" measure used
for both these institutions was the ratio of companies priva-
tized in each year by the NIFs and the ministry, respective-
ly, to the pool of companies available for privatization and at
their disposal. The type of investor to whom companies
were sold was taken into consideration. It turned out that
the privatization efficiency (or speed) is much higher at the
funds than at the ministry. We also showed that NIF effi-
ciency, both in absolute terms and relative to MST privatiza-
tion efficiency, reached a peak in 1998. Since 1999, in which
privatization and bankruptcy exceeded the critical amount
equal to half of the companies held by the NIFs, their priva-
tization efficiency has been decreasing. We can, moreover,
hypothesize that privatization will continue to slow down
over the next few years due to the aforementioned factors
– i.e., the unwillingness of the funds to liquidate quickly, the
continuation of restructuring strategies and the continually
decreasing number of companies available for privatization.
In conclusion, we can say that while the introduction of the
NIF program made it possible to accelerate the privatization
of state-owned companies considerably for a few years,
internal barriers that appeared in the program because of its
incentive system have slowed down this pace again. 
In the next part of our paper we looked at the reaction
of the market prices of NIFs' shares to the differences in the
privatization activities of the funds. The analysis of the cor-
relation shows a very strong positive relationship between
the real price of a fund share on the one hand and the num-
ber of companies sold to foreign investors. There is also a
positive correlation between the real price and the number
of companies quoted on the public market, the number of
companies sold to domestic investors and the total privati-
zation activity of funds. We conclude, therefore, that the
capital market places a premium on funds whose privatiza-
tion strategies put special emphasis on selling companies to
foreign investors and, to a lesser extent, selling companies
to domestic investors and quoting them on the public mar-
kets. Finally, it seems that the capital market rewards a high
rate of privatization activity, which is reflected in the higher
prices of the funds' shares.
With respect to the evolution of ownership structure of
the NIF portfolio companies themselves, we found that as of
December 2000, over half of these companies (278) have
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found new investors, including companies quoted on the
stock exchange (27) or over-the-counter market (12). In
addition, 78 companies were under bankruptcy or liquida-
tion procedures (of which nine have already been liquidat-
ed at the time of writing). In all, secondary privatization has
affected, in our estimation, 330 firms. Some of them have
mixed structures; for instance, part of the shares of a com-
pany with an active shareholder may be traded on the stock
exchange. In 57 firms, foreign investors have appeared. In
89 companies the State Treasury share has been reduced to
zero. Each NIF sold between 5 and 23 of its portfolio com-
panies to investors. Of the 278 NIF companies transferred
to date, 91 were sold in 1999 and 2000. On the whole,
therefore, we have not observed a significant acceleration in
this area. All categories of investors participating in other
types of privatization in Poland are represented among the
new owners of the NIF companies. The most numerous
new owners are domestic strategic investors (large domes-
tic companies), who became shareholders in over 134 com-
panies. The next, most numerous category of new owners
consists of foreign investors, who have taken over 57 firms.
Individual private owners took over 48 firms. Employees
became shareholders in 14 NIF companies99. Finally, 25
companies were publicly quoted (on the stock exchange
and the over-the-counter market). Among these publicly
traded companies, 16 companies also have leading share-
holders. 
To conclude this section, we turned our attention to a
more detailed examination of the ownership structure of
the NIF portfolio companies. According to these data, the
concentration in the companies began to increase, more
slowly than in the funds, but remarkably. By the year 2000,
the largest shareholders were in near-absolute control in
about one third of the companies. 
With respect to the concentration of ownership stakes,
it is striking that, on the average, most strategic investors
have gained absolute control (more than 50%) of the firms'
equity. Financial institutions and other NIFs have, on aver-
age, about 33–35% of shares. The employees, who were
given special privileges in the Polish mass privatization, have
acquired control of only a small number of companies.
These numbers and tendencies go a long way to meeting
the initial objectives of the program and are in sharp con-
trast with the overall negative assessment of the NIF
scheme. It seems likely that the character of the secondary
ownership changes in the NIF companies provides some
promise for the development of their future potential. The
structure of ownership emerging in these companies is dif-
ferent from the structure that had been created in the pool
of firms privatized by other methods in Poland, since in
most cases new strategic investors, who can be future
agents of changes, have appeared.
The final part of our paper deals with the economic per-
formance of NIF portfolio companies. We report that the
economic and financial performance of the NIF companies
deteriorated in the early stage of the program because of its
delay and the lack of restructuring activities during the wait-
ing phase. This resulted in a very sharp decline of all eco-
nomic and financial indicators of the whole NIF sector.
Other systemic reasons that were discussed above seem to
have strengthened this tendency. We discussed selected
economic and financial indicators for the entire group of
NIF portfolio companies from 1991 to 1999, in comparison
with other groups of Polish firms, categorized by the char-
acter of their ownership. This analysis gives little grounds
for optimism. In 1995, profitability fell rapidly, and the NIF
group became unprofitable. Their performance continued
to deteriorate in each subsequent year (with the exception
of 1997).
In 1999 this group of Polish enterprises had the worst
profitability of those presented in the analysis. Net prof-
itability started to decrease for the NIF companies in 1995
and never recovered. Much better results were achieved
in 1999 by other groups of privatized enterprises, and
even by State Treasury companies. It is clear that the cap-
ital and/or strategies of other investors were more effec-
tive in generating improvements in companies than were
the NIFs. The percentage of NIF firms achieving profits
was also one of the lowest, and was systematically declin-
ing. The entire financial analysis of NIF companies in com-
parison with other Polish companies leads us to the con-
clusion that control by the funds has not caused an
improvement in the performance of the portfolio compa-
nies which are in weak condition. 
In the final section of our paper we investigated the
financial situation of NIF companies that have undergone
secondary ownership changes (i.e., have been sold to new
owners), using a database on individual companies that we
compiled. We divided the NIF companies into groups by the
type of new owners emerging as a result of secondary own-
ership changes: 
– domestic and foreign strategic investors, 
– private individuals, 
– employees, 
–·dispersed ownership (companies quoted on the stock
exchange), and 
– those companies in which (a) National Investment
Fund(s) continues to be the main owner. 
We additionally divided the firms that had undergone
secondary ownership changes into groups by the date of
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their sale, in order to take into account the length of the
period of influence of the new owners on the enterprises. In
analyzing the economic indicators and financial ratios we
also took into account the number of the firms that have
undergone bankruptcy or liquidation as a measure of the
failures of different types of owners.
Because of methodological problems described in the
paper, it was very difficult to find significant results from
this investigation. In a group of companies as large and
diversified as the NIF portfolio companies, given these
methodological problems, the best measure of perfor-
mance appears to be sales. The ratio of sales in 1999 to
sales in 1995 allowed us to draw conclusions concerning
the change in the companies' financial and market situation
during that period. We observed the worst situation in
companies sold to domestic individuals and employees.
The drastic drop in sales (ranging from 30 to 60% for the
whole period) for these groups shows that they experi-
enced no positive effects of privatization during that peri-
od. This result is supported by the fact that the highest
percentage of companies which have entered bankruptcy
or liquidation is found in the group of companies sold to
domestic individuals (of 40 such companies, 10 – or 25%
– entered bankruptcy or liquidation).
A significant decline was also experienced by companies
which were not sold by the NIFs (i.e., where the largest
block of shares still belongs to the leading NIF) and by com-
panies which were traded publicly (with the exception of
two companies which were only listed in 1999). Although at
first glance the status of these two groups of companies
appears to be different, it turns out that from the point of
view of ownership control they are in similar situations. The
largest block of shares in a typical publicly traded company
continues to be held by the company's leading NIF or is held
by a large, dispersed group of shareholders. Thus, these
companies continue to lack a strong outside investor who
could bring them capital, know-how, etc. We observed the
smallest deterioration in 1995–1999 sales performance in
the groups of companies sold to domestic corporations and
foreign investors in 1996 and 1997. The groups in which
these surprisingly good indicators are found are those which
were sold relatively early. Companies sold in 1998 (espe-
cially to foreign investors) had much worse results. The
worst figures are observed for companies sold latest – in
1999 (these figures are comparable with those for publicly
traded companies and those which continue to be owned by
the NIFs). We seem, therefore, to have confirmed our
hypothesis, that quick, efficiently organized privatization and
secondary privatization help enterprises to maintain or
improve their economic and market standing. The NIF Pro-
gram, which in effect "privatized" the process of privatiza-
tion of the portfolio companies, was a success to the extent
that it led to the rapid sale of medium-sized and large com-
panies to domestic corporations and foreign investors,
which helped those companies to at least maintain their
market position. However, the financial situation of small
companies sold cheaply to domestic individuals and employ-
ees, companies sold relatively late (1998–1999), and com-
panies listed on the stock exchange is much worse and can
be ascribed to the lack of a strong investor over a relatively
long period of time. The results of this study seen to confirm
the hypothesis that the pace of secondary privatization (time
efficiency) and the quality of the investors taking part in it
may have more influence on its effects than the level of con-
centration of ownership.
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Table 1A. Concentration indexes C1 and C3 for all National Investment Funds
  30.6.1998 30.9.1998 31.12.1998 31.3.1999 30.6.1999 30.9.1999
C1 5.41% 9.18% 10.20% 14.23% 16.62% 19.20%
C3 6.97% 16.24% 20.94% 28.67% 33.34% 34.97%
 31.12.1999 31 .3.2000 30.6.2000 30.9.2000 31.12.2000
C1 19.26% 22.39% 23.10% 24.67% 23.86%
C3 36.41% 38.68% 40.02% 42.05% 41.84%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG), Polish Press Agency (PAP), Notoria Service and own calculations.
Table 2A. Concentration indexes C1 and C3 for all 15 National Investment Funds separately as of the end of 1998, 1999 and 2000
% NIF I NIF II NIF III NIF IV NIF V NIF VI NIF VII NIF VIII
C1
1998 10.01 13.91 20.15 5.27 5.97 6.47 8.57 7.73
1999 11.58 19.75 32.00 21.05 14.77 24.67 8.72 19.80
2000 16.67 20.20 32.76 21.34 14.97 24.79 17.62 21.88
C3
1998 21.59 22.03 31.93 15.48 16.76 17.64 19.38 13.72
1999 24.86 27.13 43.13 44.79 36.34 50.91 25.47 35.82
2000 37.08 42.06 37.65 45.39 36.83 56.34 39.08 43.08
% NIF IX NIF X NIF XI NIF XII NIF XIII NIF XIV NIF XV
C1
1998 19.33 7.88 15.33 9.09 9.68 8.01 9.71
1999 21.63 8.73 32.00 14.62 9.78 11.29 30.36
2000 21.71 19.33 - 14.62 14.32 23.37 50.73
C3
1998 39.58 20.17 25.36 21.97 22.71 21.12 18.05
1999 42.37 22.73 42.64 33.68 28.70 29.66 45.35
2000 42.12 42.77 - 31.68 34.01 42.31 60.94
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG), Polish Press Agency (PAP), Notoria Service and own calculations.
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Table 3A. Main institutional investors in NIFs as of the end of 1998 and 2000
% NIF I NIF II NIF III NIF IV NIF V NIF VI NIF VII NIF VIII
98 00 98 00 98 00 98 00 98 00 98 00 98 00 98 00
BRE 10.0 14.2 – – – – – – – 15.0 – – – – – –
Deusche Bank – 16.7 – 11.9 – – – 6.6 – – – – – 10.0 – 5.1
PZU – – 13.9 20.2 5.5 – 5.1 21.3 5.1 – 5.05 – – – – –
Pekao – – – – 20.2 32.8 – – – – – – – – – –
Raiffeisen – – – – – – 5.1 14.6 – – – – – – – –
AIB – – – – – – – – – – – 21.6 – – – –
Copernicus – – – – – – – – – – 6.5 10.0 – – – 10.0
NIF Fund Holdings – – – – – – – – – – 5.6 24.8 – – 7.7 21.9
Everest Capital – – – – – – – – – – – – – 7.1 – –
Arnhold &
Bleichroeder
2.6 5.1 – – – 4.9 – – – – – – 8.6 5.3 – –
Poland Opportunity
Fund
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Kredyt Bank PBI – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
CS First Boston 5.3 – – – 6.3 – 5.3 – 5.3 – – – 5.5 – – –
Bank Austria – 5.6 – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
% NIF IX NIF X NIF XI NIF XII NIF XIII NIF XIV NIF XV
98 00 98 00 98 98 00 98 00 98 00 98 00
BRE – – – – – – – 9.7 9.8 – – – –
Deusche Bank – – – 10.6 – – – – 5.1 – 9.7 – –
PZU 19.3 21.7 5.2 9.9 10.0 – – 5.2 – 5.2 – 8.3 –
Pekao 14.9 15.3 – – 15.3 – – – – – – – –
Raiffeisen – – – – – – – – – – – – –
AIB – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Copernicus – – – – – 7.8 10.0 – – – – – –
NIF Fund Holdings – – 6.1 6.2 – 5.1 14.6 – – – – – –
Everest Capital – – – 19.3 – – – – 14.3 6.9 23.4 – –
Arnhold & Bleichroeder – – 7.9 – – – – – – – – – –
Poland Opportunity Fund – – 5.1 12.9 – – – – – 5.1 9.3 – –
Kredyt Bank PBI – – – – – 9.1 7.1 – – – – – –
CS First Boston 5.3 4.8 6.2 – – – – 7.1 – 8.0 – – –
Bank Austria – – – – – – – – – – – 9.7 53.7
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG), Polish Press Agency (PAP), Notoria Service and own calculations.
Table 4A. Shares controlled directly or indirectly by PZU S.A. as of January 2001 (without the shares of the State Treasury)
NIF II NIF IV NIF VII NIF IX NIF X
PZU S.A. and PZU Zycie S.A. 20.20% 21.34% <5% 21.71% 9.93%
Wood & Company - - 17.62 - -
Deutsche Bank 11.92% 6.35% 9.98% - 10.58%
Arnhold & Bleichroeder - - 5.26% - -
NIF IV - Progress 6.71% - - 5.14% -
NIF IX 9.94% 9.48% - - -
NIF X - - - 8.84% -
TOTAL 48.77% 37.17% 32.86% 35.69% 20.51%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG).
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Table 5A. The main shareholders of NIFs controlled by BRE Bank and Everest Capital in January 2001
NIF I NIF V NIF XIII NIF XIV
BRE S.A. 14.22% 14.97% 9.78% -
Everest Capital - - 14.32% 23.37%
Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, Inc 5.11% - - -
Deutsche Bank 16.47% - 5.11% 9.65%
Poland Opportunity Fund - - - 9.27%
NIF I - 5.56% 5.11% -
NIF V Victoria 6.19% - 9.91% -
NIF XIII Fortuna 5.69% 11.60% - -
State Treasury 12.47% 15.00% 16.34% 15.00%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG).
Table 6A. The main shareholders of NIFs controlled by BRE Bank and Everest Capital in January 2000
I NIF V NIF VII NIF X NIF XIII NIF XIV NIF
BRE S.A. 11.58% 14.77% - - 9.78%
Everest Capital - - - 19.33% 14.32% 7.01%
The Baupost Group 7.64% - - - -6.09% -
Credit Suisse First Boston
Nominees
5.39% 5.33% 8.45% 6.37% 9.26% 9.20%
Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, Inc. 5.05% - 8.57% - - -
Deutsche Bank 5.64% - - 5.36% - 11.29%
Poland Opportunity Fund - - - 8.73% - 9.17
NIF Funds Holding - - - 6.15% - -
NIF I - 5.49% - - - -
NIF V Victoria - - - - 9.66% -
NIF VII - - - 5.03% - -
NIF X Foksal - - 8.72% - - -
NIF XIII Fortuna - 11.45% - - - -
NIF XIV Zachodni - - 5.62% 7.63% - -
State Treasury 16.00% 16.12% 16.12% 16.12% 16.12% 15.00%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG).
Table 7A. The main shareholders of NIFs controlled by Pekao S.A. as of the end of 1998, 1999, 2000*
 1998 1999 1998 1999 2000
 NIF III NIF XI Jupiter
Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder, Inc. 0.00% 5.32% 0.00% 5.53% 4.89%
PEKAO S.A. 20.15% 32.00% 15.33% 32.00% 32.76%
Credit Suisse First Boston Nominees 6.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
PZU S.A.+ PZU Zycie 5.49% 0.00% 10.03% 0.00% 0.00%
The Baupost Group 5.26% 6.81% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG).
* The data for 1998 and 1999 concern NIF III and XI. The data for 2000 concern NIF Jupiter, which was created in 2000 by a merger of NIF III and XI.
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Table 8A. The main shareholders of NIFs XV and VI as of the end of 1998, 1999, 2000
1998 1999 2000
NIF XV- Hetman
AGK Consulting 0.00% 0.00% 7.21%
Bank Austria 9.71% 30.36% 53.73%
PZU Zycie + PZU S.A. 8.34% 14.99% 0.00%
NIF VI- Magna
AIB Capital Markets 0.00% 7.10% 21.57%
Copernicus Invst. 6.47% 9.85% 9.98%
WBK S.A. 5.59% 16.39% 0.00%
NIF Fund Holding PCC 5.58% 24.67% 24.79%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG).
Table 9A. The main shareholders of VIII and XII NIFs as of the end of 1998, 1999, 2000
 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
 NIF VIII- Octava NIF XII- Piast
Westgate International 0.00% 0.00% 11.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Copernicus 0.00% 9.97% 9.97% 7.78% 9.97% 9.97%
Deutche Bank 0.00% 5.06% 5.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Baupost Group LLC, Cambridge 5.99% 6.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
NIF Fund Holdings PCC 7.73% 19.80% 21.88% 5.10% 14.62% 14.62%
Kredyt Bank PBI SA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 7.09%
Source: The Polish Security and Exchange Commission (KPWiG).
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Table 10A. Management firms selected by the Ministry of Ownership Transformation and managing NIFs as of the end of 2000
NIF Chosen management firm approved by the
Minister of Ownership Transformation
The management firm as of the end of 2000
NIF I BRE/ Giro Credit Management:
- BRE (PL)
- Giro Credit (Austria)
BRE Private Equity Management Group:
- BRE
- Cresco Management Group
- Everest Capital
NIF II Hevelius Management:
- UNP Int (PL)
- Bank Gdanski (PL)
- Murray Johnstone (GB)
PZU NIF Management:
- PZU S.A. (PL)
- PZU Zycie S.A. (PL)
NIF III JUPITER Trinity Management:
- Barclays de Zoete Wedd (GB)
- Bank Pekao S.A. (PL)
- Company Assistance (PL)
Trinity Management:
- Bank Pekao S.A. (PL)
- Company Assistance (PL)
NIF IV Konsorcjum Raiffeisen Atkins:
- Raiffaisen (Austria)
- WS Atkins (GB)
PZU NIF Management:
- PZU S.A. (PL)
- PZU Zycie S.A. (PL)
NIF V VICTORIA Polskie Towarzystwo Prywatyzacyjno- Kleinwort
Benson:
- PBR (PL)
- Kleinwort Benson (GB)
BRE Private Equity Management Group:
- BRE
- Cresco Management Group
- Everest Capital
NIF VI Chase Gemina Polska:
- Chase Gemina (USA/I)
- WBK (PL)
- Nicom Consulting (PL)
AIB WBK Found:
- WBK
- Nicom Consulting
- AIB
NIF VII Kazimierz Wielki Fund Management:
- Lazard Freres (FR)
- GICC Capital  (USA)
- BGK
None
NIF VIII KP Konsorcjum:
- Bank Handlowy (PL)
- Yourk Trust (GB)
- Kennedy Associates (USA)
KP Konsorcjum:
- Bank Handlowy (PL)
- Yourk Trust (GB)
- Kennedy Associates (USA)
NIF IX None PZU NIF Management:
- PZU S.A. (PL)
- PZU Zycie S.A. (PL)
NIF X Fidea Management:
- Banque Arjil (FR)
- ARP (PL)
- WGC (PL)
None
NIF XI KN Wasserstein:
- KNK Finance and Invest
- Wasserstein Perrella
Trinity Management:
- Bank Pekao S.A. (PL)
- Company Assistance (PL)
NIF XII BNP- PBI Eurofund Management:
- BNP (FR)
- PBI (PL)
 KP Konsorcjum:
- Bank Handlowy (PL)
- Yourk Trust (GB)
- Kennedy Associates (USA)
NIF XIII Yamaichi Regent Special:
- Yamaichi Intr. (GB)
- Regent Pacific (GB)
BRE Private Equity Management Group:
- BRE
- Cresco Management Group
- Everest Capital
NIF XIV International Westfund Holdings:
- Bank Zachodni (PL)
- Central European Trust
- Credit commercial de France
BRE Private Equity Management Group:
- BRE
- Cresco Management Group
- Everest Capital
NIF XV Creditanstalt- SCG Investment Fund Manag.:
- Creditanstalt (A)
- St. Gallen Consulting (H)
 CA IB Management:
-       Creditanstalt (A)
Source: CASE
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Table 11A. The management costs of the management firms*
NIF 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Sum Fees for
financial
perfor-
mance
Global fee
NIF I 3,435.1 8,943.1 10,197.0 11,018.0 12,154.0 8,318.0 54,065.2 8,330.4 62,395.6
NIF II 3,701.1 8,059.9 861.4 1,501.0 4,103.0 6,829.0 25,055.4 4,150.0 29,205.4
Jupiter 7,130.4 14,803.0 11,732.0 11,990.0 15,474.0 11,134.0 72,263.4 20,577.9 92,841.3
NIF IV 2,615.5 7,238.0 9,003.9 9,066.0 2,633.0 6,880.0 37,436.4 9,989.1 47,425.5
NIF V 4,620.8 11,866.4 13,041.0 10,823.0 6,286.0 7,821.0 54,458.2 6,131.4 60,589.6
NIF VI 3,422.0 8,590.4 9,842.5 10,129.0 11,256.0 10,544.0 53,783.9 10,910.3 64,694.2
NIF VII 3,185.8 8,280.4 9,922.0 4,709.0 4,714.0 5,341.0 36,152.2 5,205.2 41,357.4
NIF VIII 2,364.6 6,000.4 7,084.0 7,337.0 8,567.0 9,038.0 40,391.0 18,192.6 58,583.6
NIF IX 816.0 1,510.3 734.0 486.0 4,956.0 6,739.0 15,241.3 4,896.1 20,137.4
NIF X 1,492.0 4,701.0 6,094.0 2,678.0 4,743.0 5,493.0 25,201.0 7,326.2 32,527.2
NIF XII 3,747.4 8,216.9 10,373.0 11,639.0 11,732.0 8,912.0 54,620.3 5,427.6 60,047.9
NIF XIII 1,598.9 7,866.5 10,117.0 11,454.0 6,376.0 8,115.0 45,527.4 7,965.5 53,492.9
NIF XIV 2,731.0 7,260.9 9,229.1 8,833.0 7,702.0 7,313.0 43,069.0 10,315.2 53,384.2
NIF XV 3,308.3 9,564.4 11,850.0 13,963.0 18,749.0 12,974.0 70,408.7 9,442.6 79,851.3
Total 44,168.9 112,901.6 120,080.9 115,626.0 119,445.0 115,451.0 627,673.4 128,860.1 756,533.5
Source: CASE.
*These costs include the NIFs' costs of financial advising in the years 1995–2000 and the annual and final performance fees for financial results  owed
to management firms for the years 1995–2000.
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